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ABSTRACT 
The Australian Army is attempting to improve retention rates, announcing a 
number of retention bonuses in 2007.  In a service that has rarely used retention bonuses, 
historical data on the effectiveness of previous bonuses is limited.  This thesis looks at 
both the effectiveness of retention bonuses in the U.S. Military, as well as an alternate 
method of establishing retention bonus levels with no historical data.  It analyses an 
experiment where a sealed-bid, second-price auction is used to set salaries levels in a 
generic labor market scenario.   
The experimental results support the literature: a second-price auction is a cost 
effective method of setting a retention bonus level.  Without historical data and prediction 
techniques, a second-price auction allows the service to obtain the exact level of manning 
necessary at a value that more accurately reflects the value of the soldier.  This reduces 
resource wastage.  Cost effectiveness is further improved by adding a second auction for 
a longer term contract.  While this analysis may be valuable to the Royal Australian 
Navy, Royal Australian Air Force and other volunteer militaries around the world, this 
thesis focuses specifically on application to the Australian Army.   
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES.....................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.............................................................................1 
1. Primary Research Question................................................................2 
2. Secondary Research Question ............................................................2 
C. SCOPE ..............................................................................................................2 
D. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS OVERVIEW..........................................2 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE RETENTION PROBLEM IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN ARMY................................................................................................5 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5 
B. AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY AND LABOR MARKET...............................5 
C. EFFECT ON THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE (ADF).................6 
D. EXPANSION OF THE ARMY.......................................................................7 
1. Defence 2000 White Paper ..................................................................7 
2. Hardened and Networked Army (HNA)............................................8 
3. Enhanced Land Force (ELF) ..............................................................8 
E. ARMY ENVIRONMENT ...............................................................................8 
1. Operational Tempo..............................................................................8 
2. Manning Trends...................................................................................9 
F. RETENTION FROM AN INVESTMENT POINT OF VIEW .................11 
1. Initial Minimum Period of Service (IMPS) .....................................11 
2. Return of Service Obligation (ROSO) .............................................12 
G. CURRENT SITUATION ..............................................................................12 
H. CURRENT BONUSES AND INCENTIVES ..............................................13 
I. THE AERRB ..................................................................................................14 
1. Retention Bonus .................................................................................14 
2. Completion Bonus..............................................................................14 
J. THE PROBLEM WITH USING RETENTION BONUSES IN 
AUSTRALIA..................................................................................................15 
K. EFFECTIVENESS OF AERRB ...................................................................16 
L. MAKING COMPARISONS TO THE U.S. MILITARY’S BONUS 
SYSTEM .........................................................................................................16 
M. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................17 
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. MILITARY RETENTION BONUS...............19 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................19 
B. THE SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS (SRB)..............................19 
C. HISTORY OF THE SRB ..............................................................................20 
D. WHO IS OFFERED THE SRB AND HOW IS IT CALCULATED? ......21 
E. EFFECTIVENESS OF SRB COMPARED TO OTHER 
INCENTIVES.................................................................................................22 
F. RECRUITMENT VS. RETENTION...........................................................23 
 viii
G. LUMP SUM VERSUS ANNUAL INSTALLMENT SRB..........................24 
H. COULD BE MORE EFFICIENT ................................................................25 
I. FLOW ON EFFECT IN LATER YEARS...................................................27 
J. LACK OF PRECISENESS OF THE SRB ..................................................27 
K. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................28 
IV. AUCTION THEORY ................................................................................................29 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................29 
B. WHAT IS AN AUCTION? ...........................................................................29 
C. FORWARD AND REVERSE AUCTIONS.................................................29 
1. Forward ..............................................................................................30 
2. Reverse ................................................................................................30 
D. AUCTION DESIGNS ....................................................................................30 
1. English Auction ..................................................................................30 
2. Dutch Auction.....................................................................................31 
3. Sealed-Bid Auctions ...........................................................................31 
a. First Price................................................................................32 
b. Second Price............................................................................32 
E. CHOICE OF MECHANISM........................................................................32 
F. AUCTIONS POSSIBLE FOR MILITARY RETENTION BONUSES....33 
1. First Price Auction.............................................................................34 
2. Second Price Auction.........................................................................36 
G. THE BEST AUCTION..................................................................................37 
H. SECOND PRICE AUCTION LIMITATIONS...........................................38 
I. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................39 
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP.......................................................................................41 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................41 
B. EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW .................................................................41 
1. Purpose and Design............................................................................41 
2. Scenario...............................................................................................42 
C. INITIAL SALARY SURVEY.......................................................................42 
D. SECOND SALARY SURVEY......................................................................43 
E. MOTIVATION ..............................................................................................45 
F. APPLICATION TO THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY ....................................45 
G. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................49 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS..................................................................................51 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................51 
B. SAMPLE.........................................................................................................51 
C. FIRST SALARY SURVEY...........................................................................53 
1. Descriptive Statistics..........................................................................53 
2. Regression Analysis ...........................................................................55 
3. Learning Effect...................................................................................57 
4. Revision of Sample Mean ..................................................................58 
D. SECOND SALARY SURVEY......................................................................58 
1. Sample.................................................................................................58 
 ix
2. Descriptive Statistics..........................................................................59 
3. Low vs. High Information Comparison...........................................61 
4. Learning Effect...................................................................................64 
5. Regression Analysis ...........................................................................65 
6. Cost Savings Achieved with the Second Stage Auction..................66 
E. DISCUSSION .................................................................................................67 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................68 
VII. ANALYSIS ..............................................................................................................69 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................69 
B. QUALITY OF SOLDIERS RETAINED.....................................................69 
C. IMPORTANCE OF A LONG-TERM CONTRACT OPTION.................69 
D. LEARNING AND TRAINING.....................................................................70 
E. IS THE NUMBER WHO WILL RECEIVE THE BONUS 
IMPORTANT?...............................................................................................71 
F. BUDGET.........................................................................................................71 
G. TRUST ............................................................................................................72 
H. BIDDING IN SMALL COHORTS - COLLUSION...................................72 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................75 
A. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................75 
1. Primary Research Question Answered............................................75 
2. Secondary Research Questions Answered.......................................75 
3. Other Research Findings...................................................................77 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY AND 
DEVELOPMENT ..........................................................................................77 
APPENDIX A.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION INDIVIDUAL 
CHOICE EXPERIMENT INITIAL SALARY SURVEY......................................79 
APPENDIX B.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION INDIVIDUAL 
CHOICE EXPERIMENT - ABOVE 90TH PERCENTILE..................................81 
APPENDIX C.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION INDIVIDUAL 
CHOICE EXPERIMENT - BELOW 90TH PERCENTILE.................................83 
APPENDIX D.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION INDIVIDUAL 
CHOICE EXPERIMENT SECOND SALARY SURVEY - BELOW 50TH 
PERCENTILE ...........................................................................................................87 
APPENDIX E.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION INDIVIDUAL 
CHOICE EXPERIMENT SECOND SALARY SURVEY – ABOVE 50TH 
PERCENTILE ...........................................................................................................89 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................91 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................95 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Australia’s historic unemployment rate [From Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2007b]................................................................................................6 
Figure 2. Australian Regular Army 12-month rolling separation rates  [From 
Directorate of Workforce Modeling and Analysis – Army (DWFMA(A)].......9 
Figure 3. Army inflow/outflow of personnel  [From DWFMA(A) and Defence 
Annual Reviews]..............................................................................................10 
Figure 4. Compensation at different reenlistment levels [After Figure 12 of 
Hattiangadi et al., 2004]...................................................................................26 
Figure 5. Example – possible bids for a Military Retention Bonus ................................34 
Figure 6. Example – possible bids for a Military Retention Bonus compared to an 
individuals true valuation.................................................................................35 
Figure 7. Example – cost of retaining eight soldiers in a second price auction, 
example in Figures 5 and 6 ..............................................................................36 
Figure 8. Employment category of experiment participants ...........................................52 
Figure 9. Gender representation of experiment participants ...........................................52 
Figure 10. Years of experience of experiment participants...............................................53 
Figure 11. Distribution of bids as a percentage of the opportunity cost – first salary 
survey...............................................................................................................54 
Figure 12. Bidding behavior across experimental rounds – first salary survey ................57 
Figure 13. Distribution of bids as a percent of the expected annual salary.......................60 
Figure 14. Distribution of bids as a percent of expected annual salary – low 
information sample ..........................................................................................63 
Figure 15. Distribution of bids as a percent of expected annual salary – high 
information sample ..........................................................................................63 
Figure 16. Bidding behavior across rounds in the second salary survey ..........................64 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Salary possibility example by employment pattern using a 30% layoff 
probability with “high” information ................................................................44 
Table 2. Experiment parallels to the Australian Army – first salary survey..................47 
Table 3. Experiment parallels to the Australian Army – second salary survey .............48 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the first salary survey – bid as a percent of the 
offer (opportunity cost) ....................................................................................55 
Table 5. First salary survey regression results ...............................................................56 
Table 6. Descriptive statistic comparison of total sample to experimental rounds 5-
18  of the first salary survey.............................................................................58 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics in the second salary survey ............................................61 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of bids for the different information levels....................62 
Table 9. Second salary survey regression ......................................................................65 
Table 10. Total salary savings by incorporating the second stage auction ......................67 
 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would first like to acknowledge the efforts of my advisors Dr. Bill Gates and Dr. 
Pete Coughlan.  Thank you for giving me the opportunity to work with you.  Your time 
and guidance as I bombarded you with questions were very much appreciated.   
Thank you also to LTCOL Paul Robards and MAJ Carrissa Ibbott.  Your 
guidance, advice and assistance in my research have saved me countless headaches. 
Finally, and most importantly, I thank my wife Jo, and my sons Tom, Mitch and 
Liam.  You have been extremely patient and understanding when I’ve been working on 
this thesis.  While this thesis has been difficult, Jo, you have had an even more difficult 
task of parenting and holding the family together while being pregnant (and now with a 
newborn)…..you are brilliant, thank you.   
 
 xvi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
 The Australian Army is trying to lift its retention rates as it attempts to grow the 
force.  In 2007, the Australian Army announced a range of retention initiatives, including 
several bonuses designed to retain appropriately skilled personnel.  In a service that has 
used retention bonuses on very few occasions, historical data on the effect of previous 
bonuses is limited.  With little or no historical data, it is difficult to accurately predict the 
bonus necessary to retain a set number of soldiers. 
All services of the United States Military have used retention bonuses extensively 
since the creation of its “All Volunteer Force.”  The Australian Defence Force (ADF) can 
learn valuable lessons by analyzing the effectiveness of such bonuses in the U.S. 
Military.  While these retention bonuses appear to be effective, scope exists to improve 
their efficiency and cost effectiveness.  Recent research at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) considered improving the cost effectiveness by using an auction process to 
set the bonus amount.  To date, this research has been largely theoretical. 
This thesis analyzes experimental data where a second-price auction is used to set 
salary levels.  Through this, as well analyzing the effectiveness of the extant U.S. 
Military retention bonus system, this thesis aims to improve the way in which the 
Australian Army sets and uses retention bonuses.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to evaluate whether a sealed bid, second-price auction is viable 
in achieving retention objectives in the Australian Army.   
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1. Primary Research Question 
The primary research question of this thesis is to determine if experimental results 
support the theory that a sealed bid, second-price auction is a cost effective means of 
setting military retention bonus levels. 
2. Secondary Research Question 
There are numerous secondary research questions necessary to consider the 
viability of an auction to set a retention bonus level.  Specifically: 
• What is the effect of an option to bid for a longer term employment 
contract?  If such an option is presented with a second stage auction, 
would it further improve cost effectiveness? 
• How would the results be affected if auction participants collude?   
• Would training in the auction process be necessary or beneficial? 
• How would an auction process be incorporated into the Australian Army’s 
retention bonus system? 
C. SCOPE 
This thesis focuses on applying both theory and experimental data to retention 
bonuses in the Australian Army.  The analysis may be equally valuable to the Royal 
Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air force, as well as the U.S. Military and other 
“all volunteer” militaries throughout the world; however, it does not specifically address 
the issues outside of the Australian Army. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis begins by explaining the current scenario facing the Australian Army, 
where retention is currently a high priority.  It then looks at how the U.S. Military has 
approached similar retention issues, using the available literature to analyze the 
effectiveness of the current program.  Auction theory is then discussed to motivate a 
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possible alternative method to set retention bonus levels.  A labor market second-price 
auction experiment conducted at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School is then described 
and the data analyzed.  The results of the data analysis will be used to propose a more 
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II. INTRODUCTION TO THE RETENTION PROBLEM IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN ARMY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Australian Army is currently in a period of expansion.  Vital to that growth is 
retaining more of the talented soldiers who make up the force.  This chapter introduces 
the retention problem in the Australian Army and provides context to discussions later in 
the thesis.  It begins by outlining the economic environment in which the expansion 
needs to occur, the expansion itself, the need for improved retention, and finally the 
Army’s reaction to this need. 
B. AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY AND LABOR MARKET 
“The Australian economy is currently in the longest period of continuous 
expansion ever recorded” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2007a).  Fifteen years of 
continuous economic growth has occurred, despite numerous shocks, such as the Asian 
financial and economic crisis, global economic slowdown in 2001 and two significant 
droughts (Commonwealth of Australia, 2007b), one of which continues to affect the 
country.  With this economic growth, the unemployment rate has fallen from its peak in 
the early 90s, as can be seen in Figure 1.  It recently reached a 34-year low, with the 
unemployment rate in February 08 falling to 4.0% (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS), 2008). Since 1996, an additional two million people are employed in the 
workforce (Costello, 2007).  Labor force participation rates were at 65% in September 07 
(ABS, 2007), slightly down from an all-time high one year earlier.  At the same time, 
Australia finds itself experiencing a shortage of skilled labor, which is currently placing 
upward pressure on wages.      
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Figure 1.   Australia’s historic unemployment rate [From Commonwealth of Australia, 
2007b] 
 
C. EFFECT ON THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE (ADF) 
As the modern battlefield changes, so too has the technology of combat.  The 
effect is that the soldier of today must be more educated and highly trained than in the 
past.  With a booming economy, low unemployment and a national skill shortage, highly 
trained ADF members suddenly become more attractive in the civilian industry.  For 
service members, higher civilian wages in response to the national skill shortage may 
cause them to look to opportunities outside of the military.  The end result is that the 
current strength of the Australian economy has made it harder to retain service personnel.   
Not only is retention more difficult in the current economic environment, but 
recruiting also becomes challenging.  With low unemployment and a high level of 
business activity, civilian industry captures a larger proportion of the young population 
that the ADF seeks to recruit.   
In summary, while many sectors benefit from a strong economy and labor market, 
Defence suffers.  In recent times, this has made retaining qualified and competent service 
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personnel and recruiting high quality applicants difficult.  This is unlikely to change in 
the foreseeable future.  Labor market issues are beyond Defence’s control, and so it is 
important that strategies are in place to allow for adaptation. 
D. EXPANSION OF THE ARMY 
The Australian Army is currently enhancing equipment and personnel 
capabilities.  Recruiting and retention have become increasingly more important as the 
Army seeks to meet its long-term manning goals.  Based on the manning in November 
2007, the Army is required to grow over 17% by 2016 (LTCOL P. Robards, personal 
communication, 22 Nov 2007).  The Defence 2000 White Paper, the Hardened Network 
Army initiative and the Enhanced Land Force initiative are the basis for the expansion 
and are discussed in the following paragraphs.    
1. Defence 2000 White Paper 
At the start of the millennium, the government released the “Defence 2000: Our 
Future Force” White Paper, which was essentially the commencement of the current 
expansion.  The White Paper directed the Army to grow so that it could “sustain a 
brigade on operations for extended periods, and at the same time maintain at least a 
battalion group available for deployment elsewhere” (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2000).  The Army’s growth was to be a significant proportion of the 2,500 personnel in 
the ADF’s planned increase by the year 2010.    
At the time of the White Paper release, separation rates were up several percent 
from the early 1990s.  The ADF had also failed to meet its recruiting goals by 25% in the 
previous year, a shortfall of 1,300 people (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000).  Despite 
the issues with both recruiting and retention at the time, the goal of 54,000 personnel in 
the ADF by the year 2010 seemed within reach, particularly because the problem had 
been highlighted early and significant reform in the area had been a feature of the White 
Paper.   
 8
2. Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) 
“Australia’s National Security – A Defence Update 2005” outlined the new 
strategic direction for the ADF as a result of the changing global environment.  The 
Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) was a concept released in December 2005, 
designed to meet the requirements of the 2000 White Paper and the 2005 Update.  In 
essence, it involves creating a larger and more capable Army able to fight in a more 
complex and lethal battlefield.  Additional and/or improved military hardware are 
progressively being introduced into the Army to enhance the force’s firepower, 
protection, mobility and communication capabilities.  In terms of personnel strength, 
HNA required an increase of 1,485 soldiers by 2015, representing an increase of 
approximately 5% over December 2005’s strength (Department of Defence, 2006a).   
3. Enhanced Land Force (ELF) 
In addition to the increase of personnel as part of HNA, the government 
announced the ELF initiative in August 2006.  The ELF’s main purpose is to provide two 
additional infantry battalions with supporting arms: in total, approx 2,600 people.  The 
reason for the additional battalions was so that Australia could continue to assist in 
regional stability operations with northern neighbors without detriment to other global 
commitments.   
E. ARMY ENVIRONMENT 
1. Operational Tempo 
The Australian Army is now maintaining an operational tempo not seen since 
World War II (Chief of Army, 2006).  The contributions arise in several forms, including 
participation in the Global War on Terrorism, peace keeping or enforcement, security 
operations for events such as the 2007 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum, and humanitarian assistance following natural disasters.  While the Australian 
Army has been very successful in recent operations, the high tempo can take its toll on 
both the serving members and their families.   
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2. Manning Trends  
When the Australian Government announced in its 2000 Defence White Paper 
that the ADF would grow by 2,500 personnel over a decade, the net flow of personnel in 
the Army—like the entire ADF—was negative.  Forecasts released in the White Paper 
suggested that if current recruiting and retention rates remained until 2010, the ADF 
would be 12,000 below the target figure of 54,000 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000).  
The requirements of HNA and ELF have now magnified the manning deficiency that 
faces the Army in particular.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Army separation rates hovered around 13% (see 
Figure 2).  By historical standards, this was high but not abnormally high.  More 
significant was the inflow and outflow of personnel in Figure 3, showing the negative 
flow of personnel into the Army in the late 90s, up until the release of the White Paper.   
 
Figure 2.   Australian Regular Army 12-month rolling separation rates  
[From Directorate of Workforce Modeling and Analysis – Army (DWFMA(A)] 
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Figure 3.   Army inflow/outflow of personnel  [From DWFMA(A) and Defence Annual 
Reviews] 
 
An important factor affecting the negative flow of personnel in this period was the 
strength of the Australian economy.  It was therefore understood that the Army needed to 
make employment conditions more favorable to be competitive in the labor market.  
Remuneration, locational stability and employment condition reform were necessary to 
meet future goals.  Several initiatives were introduced as a result of the White Paper, and 
for the next three years there was a positive flow into the Army.       
It was in financial years 04/05 and 05/06 that manning again declined.  Separation 
rates rose to almost the levels of the late 90s/early 2000s and recruiting could not 
compensate, let alone grow the force.  There were several contributing factors, including 
the economy continuing to strengthen and the increasing operational tempo taking its toll 
on families.  Critics claimed that the Army had not done enough to improve financial and 
non-financial conditions to recruit and retain the necessary force. 
The high separation rate (by historical standards) in recent times can be attributed 
to several things.  The 2006 Defence Attitude Survey highlighted several possibilities; 
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significantly that satisfaction with salaries had declined for four consecutive years 
(Department of Defence, 2007a).  However, pay is not the only issue responsible for high 
separation levels.  The regular posting cycle affecting family stability, and an inefficient 
career management structure, are both reasons that tend to appear frequently in literature 
on ADF retention in the past 15 years.     
F. RETENTION FROM AN INVESTMENT POINT OF VIEW 
Like most western militaries, the ADF funds much of the training and education 
necessary to enable a member to do their job. When a member leaves, they take with 
them their experience and the benefits of any job-specific training and education 
provided—this is not dissimilar to what occurs in a civilian organization.  The resulting 
gap can be dealt with in two ways, either by requiring more work out of the existing staff 
or by recruiting a replacement.   
However, a replacement can not be recruited immediately when an experienced 
soldier leaves the force; instead, it may take many years to develop a person to the same 
standard. As a general rule, the ADF “grows” its own hierarchy where all recruited 
personnel go through either recruit or officer training and begin at the lowest rank.  The 
2000 White Paper explains that many are leaving at the point where they have the most to 
contribute.   
Ideally, the Army would like a positive return on investment (ROI) for the 
education and training provided to each individual.  To do this, the Army employs two 
basic strategies: 
1. Initial Minimum Period of Service (IMPS) 
The IMPS is the obligated period for which a soldier enlists.  Different 
occupations within the Army require different IMPS, but in general, non-technical jobs 
require a four-year IMPS while technical jobs require six years.   
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2. Return of Service Obligation (ROSO) 
A ROSO is similar to an IMPS and is established for educational courses or 
“general training” that has value to the service member outside of the ADF.  The basic 
rule for ROSO is for the member to provide the same number of years to the service as in 
training plus one additional year.  For example, four years of officer training which 
includes an undergraduate degree attracts a five-year ROSO.    
IMPS and ROSO requirements do not take into account the exact value of an 
individual training course, instead taking a simplified view with the same rules for 
everybody.  Depending on the value of the course, Defence may or may not get a positive 
ROI from the service member.   
It makes sense that the longer an individual serves, the more likely it is that the 
ADF will achieve a positive ROI for the education or training provided.  This leads to a 
more senior and more experienced force, creating efficiencies for the organization.  
While an aging force can lead to additional costs in terms of housing and medical 
expenses, the benefits include lower recruiting and training costs.   
G. CURRENT SITUATION 
The problem of growing the Army is more than a recruiting issue.  When creating 
two new battalions to meet the requirements of ELF, the battalion hierarchical structure 
essentially dictates the growth strategy.  Under the right conditions, many of the positions 
at the rank of Private, Lance Corporal and Lieutenant could be recruited; however, it is 
not so easy at other rank levels within the hierarchy.  As the Chief of Army, Lieutenant 
General Leahy said in March 2007 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2007c):  
I need Corporals, Sergeants, Captains and Majors to make two new 
infantry battalions.  I cannot recruit them; I can only make them, and they 
take between six and…12 years to make.  
Retention of personnel at those ranks has therefore become a high priority. 
As mentioned previously, the retention problem is not new to the Army.  The 
literature reveals numerous reviews into the problem, including the Glenn review in 
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1995, five years before announcement of ADF growth in the 2000 White Paper.  
Retention focus pre-2000 was more about cost and efficiency, where now the focus is in 
terms of force expansion.  While the focus may have been historically different, the 
principals to achieve lower separation remain the same, and many of the 
recommendations of earlier reviews have taken (or are still taking) time to implement.   
Jans and Frazer-Jans (2006) conducted a study into retention strategies for 
General Service Officers.  They found that 39% of officers surveyed indicated their 
intention to leave the army in the next three years.  They also showed that the career 
commitment of junior officers had fallen over the ten years to 2005: 38% of junior 
officers (LT and CAPT) intend to separate within three years compared to 30% in 1995.  
While surveyed intentions generally overestimate actual behavior, Jans and Frazer-Jans 
noted a high correlation between actual current separation rates and separation intentions.  
Jans and Frazer Jans (2006) make several recommendations to address the officer-
retention problem.  One of the key recommendations was to use initiatives that provide a 
“short, sharp shock” to separation rates to get the manning back under control before 
more robust and sustainable measures are put in place.  In effect, this strategy was a 
means of buying time to develop longer term retention initiatives.  It is also a means of 
reducing the effects of a downward spiral: as people leave, more work is required of the 
existing personnel, which could lead to lower morale and further separations. 
In 2006, soon after Jans and Frazer-Jans completed their study, the “Henry 
Report” was completed.  The Henry Report was another review of strategies for 
improved recruiting and retention in the ADF.  While the outcomes of this review are 
unknown, it is worth noting that much of the recent government spending on recruiting 
and retention followed closely after the Henry Report was finalized.     
H. CURRENT BONUSES AND INCENTIVES 
In December 2006, the Australian Government announced a $1.016 billion 
(AUD) package to overhaul the ADF recruiting and retention incentives.  They further 
added to this in the 2007/08 Budget with an additional $2.071 billion over 10 years 
(Department of Defence, 2007b).   
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As part of the allocated funds, the Army announced its “Army Expansion Rank 
Retention Bonus” (AERRB).  In short, the bonus offers targeted financial incentives to 
personnel who hold high-value skills and/or experience in certain ranks necessary for 
expanding the Army.  All retention bonuses announced at the time were “short-term 
measure(s) until other major career and remuneration reforms are in place” (Department 
of Defence 2006b). The next section looks more closely at the AERRB targeted at 
personnel at the rank of Corporal, Sergeant, Captain and Major.   
I. THE AERRB 
Retention bonuses in the Australian Army have not commonly been used.  In 
recent years, only selected occupation categories received bonuses when retention rates 
were critically low.  The introduction of more widespread bonuses, as recently occurred 
in March 2007, was new territory for the Australian Army.  Unlike the United States 
Military, which has used reenlistment bonuses for approximately 40 years, Australia has 
limited historical data on bonus amounts that have achieved certain retention levels.   
The AERRB was designed to encourage experienced Corporals, Sergeants, 
Captains and Majors to commit to four more years of service beyond the major separation 
hurdle of the first two to three years in rank (Business Case for AERRB, n.d.).  To be 
eligible for the bonuses, a Corporal or Sergeant must have served two years in rank, and a 
Captain or Major must have served three years in rank, thereby applying the bonus at the 
critical separation point.  The two components of the scheme are: 
1. Retention Bonus  
$10,000 AUD paid up front for a commitment of an additional year of service. 
2. Completion Bonus  
$30,000 AUD paid at the end of an additional three years following the period 
served for the retention bonus. 
This author was unable to uncover the connection between desired retention and 
the AERRB that effectively pays $10,000 p.a. for four years.  It is not known whether the 
Army used the limited historical data it holds on previous retention bonuses and survey 
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data, or if data from another country (such as the United States) was used to estimate the 
necessary bonus.  Whichever the case, this author believes either method would be 
inaccurate to judge the appropriate bonus for a desired level of retention.  The lack of 
appropriate data (as the AERRB is the first of its kind) would have essentially forced the 
Army to make a leap of faith in determining its rate.   
J. THE PROBLEM WITH USING RETENTION BONUSES IN AUSTRALIA 
The fact that Australia has a limited history with retention bonuses means there is 
insufficient data available to provide meaningful analyses to predict retention levels 
achievable with certain bonuses.  Inaccuracies in the necessary bonus level could be 
costly to the Army in either financial or manning terms.  Almost 5,000 serving members 
were offered the AERRB in March 2007.  If, hypothetically, $9,000 would have retained 
the necessary people, the Army could have paid $5 million (AUD) too much.  On the 
other hand, if the $10,000 offered was slightly too low, insufficient people would be 
retained and the manning gap would grow further, creating a larger retention problem in 
subsequent years.  This might lead the Army to offer higher future bonuses, which 
teaches service members to wait for the higher second offer in the future, thereby costing 
the Army more money.  
This appears to be the problem with offering any set bonus; there is no real way of 
knowing the effectiveness of this bonus until it is too late.  Important questions that need 
to be considered before implementing a bonus are: 
• Is it enough to entice the total number of personnel needed?  or 
• Is it too much?  Will valuable resources be wasted on retaining more 
personnel than the service actually needs? 
• Are quality personnel being retained? 
These questions are not easily answered, and it is for this reason that this study 
was conducted.  This study is important as the recently offered bonuses may have cost the 
government more than necessary, or conversely may not have been sufficient to achieve 
the desired effect.  The use of an auction process may be a cost effective strategy to retain 
the right number of personnel. 
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K. EFFECTIVENESS OF AERRB 
It is too soon to analyze the effectiveness of the AERRB (i.e., did it achieve its 
desired retention levels or was it overkill resulting in resource wastage?).  The only real 
means of predicting its effect is to analyze similar bonuses in other countries.  The United 
States, which has used such bonuses, provides an ideal learning platform.    
L. MAKING COMPARISONS TO THE U.S. MILITARY’S BONUS SYSTEM  
Learning from another country’s use of retention bonuses is not as simple as it 
sounds.  When attempting to apply logic from one country to another, policy differences 
complicate the process.  One of the major differences is the enlistment contract system of 
the U.S. compared with open ended engagements in Australia. 
Australian service personnel who have completed their initial obligation are 
generally on open ended contracts.  Additionally, Australia does not employ an “up or 
out” system where people uncompetitive for promotion are required to leave the service.  
This means that unless a member is serving an IMPS or ROSO, they can discharge from 
the service when they want, or continue to serve as long as they desire.  There are some 
obvious exceptions to this, including discharges for poor performance or disciplinary 
reasons, and the mandatory retirement age of 60.   
The benefit of an open ended engagement system is that it appeals more to 
“Generation Y” who have now become the Army’s recruiting focus.  However, the 
disadvantage of an open ended engagement system comes when trying to predict the 
number of personnel retained when applying a retention bonus.  With the AERRB in 
Australia, service members wanting to retain the flexibility to resign when they want 
could decline the bonus offer but continue to serve.  Therefore, any models used to find a 
bonus amount that gives a necessary retention level are likely to underestimate the true 
retention of personnel.   
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M. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced the retention problem that faces the Australian Army 
and the environment in which the problem must be addressed.  The Army has made 
initial steps to address the retention problem, but it is too early to tell if these steps were 
effective.  Without doubt, the Army is learning from its own experience with its first use 
of wide spread retention bonuses; however, there are other lessons that can be learned 
from the experience of foreign militaries, and an analysis of the U.S. bonus system will 
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III. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. MILITARY RETENTION 
BONUS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Australian Army is relatively new to the 
concept of retention bonuses.  In a time where increased retention has become a necessity 
and using retention bonuses a reality, it is important to learn from other militaries that 
have greater experience in this area.  The U.S. Military, having used retention bonuses for 
approximately 40 years, provides an ideal learning platform.  While policy differences do 
not allow a U.S. bonus template to be directly applied to the Australian Army, there are 
still important lessons to be learned by studying both the problems and successes of the 
U.S. program. 
This chapter looks at the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) used in all four 
services of the U.S. Military.  It starts by explaining the SRB, its use and its history.  It 
then looks at the effectiveness of the SRB compared to other alternatives and the 
effectiveness of how it is applied. 
B. THE SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS (SRB) 
As the U.S. Military does not have open ended engagements for their enlisted 
personnel, those wishing to continue to serve beyond their contract must reenlist for 
another fixed period.  The problem is that often the number and skill mix of those 
wishing to reenlist does not meet the needs of the individual service.   
The most commonly used tool to increase reenlistments to meet the service need 
is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB).  The SRB is a cash incentive paid to enlisted 
members to encourage reenlistment.  It is designed to encourage retention of those who 
have the skills necessary to meet the services’ ongoing needs.  Historically, the SRB 
program has been the U.S. Navy’s most cost effective tool in targeting retention and 
increasing the numbers of experienced personnel (Cylke, Hogan & Mackin, n.d.). 
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As the Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr. stated in 
November 2006:   
The goal of SRB is to ensure our mission readiness by ensuring sailors 
with the right skill mix are available to the fleet…The bonuses are an 
extremely flexible, positive and ultimately effective tool for ensuring 
sailors reenlist…where we need them most.  
C. HISTORY OF THE SRB 
The U.S. Military first started using reenlistment bonuses in 1965 to combat 
problems in first term retention and career manning.  In 1974, the program was adjusted 
and was renamed the Selective Reenlistment Bonus.  While the payment method and 
various administrative processes have evolved since 1974, the purpose of increasing 
reenlistments where there would otherwise be shortages remains the same.  Hattiangadi, 
Ackerman, Kimble and Quester (2004) highlight that two areas are at risk of shortages: 
those technical jobs where members have skills highly valued in the civilian economy 
(and consequently have better civilian alternatives), and those jobs that are arduous. 
While many non-monetary conditions effect reenlistment decisions, higher levels 
of monetary compensation relative to civilian industry are associated with higher levels 
of retention.  Theoretically, compensation increases in the form of a bonus and a pay 
raise essentially have the same effect; however, the U.S. Military generally uses SRBs 
because of their relative flexibility.  Asch et al. (2002) explain the flexible nature of the 
SRB as the ability to “respond to temporary changes in reenlistment rates, such as those 
resulting from cyclical changes in the civilian economy that alters the flow of personnel 
to the mid career and senior ranks.”   
The SRB has become the primary tool for affecting reenlistment rates 
(Hattiangadi et al., 2004).  This is due to both its flexibility and cost effectiveness relative 
to other incentives, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  The importance the 




growth in the SRB budget over the last decade, where there have been increases in 
financial sums offered as well as a broadening of the number of skill sets eligible for the 
bonuses.   
D. WHO IS OFFERED THE SRB AND HOW IS IT CALCULATED? 
 As the name suggests, not all service members are eligible for the SRB at the end 
of their contract.  To be eligible, an individual must possess one of the skill sets that the 
service needs.  Natural reenlistment rates for that particular skill must be lower than 
needed by the service for an SRB to be offered.  Additionally, the individual must meet 
certain eligibility criteria, be recommended for reenlistment, and sign on for at least 
another three years of service. 
The formula for the dollar value of the SRB is: 
 
 $ SRB = Monthly Base Pay  Additional Years of Commitment  SRB Multiple  × ×
 
The SRB multiple could conceivably be any positive number; however, the U.S. 
Department of Defense permits multiples between 0.5 and 15 (Hattiangadi et al., 2004).  
In practice, multiples above 6 are rarely used.  A multiple is chosen dependent on the 
necessary retention level.  Regression models using historical data estimate the 
reenlistment percentages achievable with certain SRB multiples.  Skill areas with 
sufficiently high natural retention may have a SRB multiple of 0, implying no bonus is 
offered for additional service.  For areas where retention is low due to more lucrative 
civilian opportunities, a multiple of 5 or 6 may be needed, which results in a large bonus 
for those willing to continue serving.   
The SRB multiples are constantly monitored and adjusted.  The need for specific 
skills, both current and future, is the primary driver of SRB levels.  This need changes as 
a result of many factors, including attrition, attitudes toward the service, economic 
conditions, mission changes and advancement in technology.  Prioritization of skill sets is 
important, because budgetary constraints do not always allow all areas to be offered the  
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necessary SRB multiple to achieve manning goals.  The juggle between budget and 
priority often results in bonus levels changing, either up or down, within a particular 
fiscal year. 
E. EFFECTIVENESS OF SRB COMPARED TO OTHER INCENTIVES 
Theoretically an increase in monetary compensation, be it through basic pay or a 
bonus, yields higher retention rates.  Higher military/civilian pay ratios have consistently 
been proven to increase military retention, holding other factors constant (such as 
economic conditions).  While the overall retention outcomes using pay and bonus options 
are similar, the overall cost effectiveness of the two methods is very different due to the 
ways in which they are applied. 
Base pay levels across all four services of the U.S. Military are linked.  A 
member’s base pay is determined by rank and time in the service.  This means, for 
example, that a Sergeant in the Army who has six years experience collects the same base 
pay as a naval Petty Officer Second Class (equivalent to an Army Sergeant) with the 
same seniority, despite the fact they have vastly different roles.   
Uniformity in base pay levels across the services makes pay raises complex.  
Raising pay to address a retention problem within one area of a service results in a pay 
raise for all skill sets across the four services.  While a simplistic example, it is easy to 
see how a pay raise to improve retention in one area is likely to result in excessive 
retention in another where it may not be necessary.  This results in unnecessary resource 
wastage, making this an expensive option.  An across the board pay raise could only be 
cost effective in increasing reenlistments where retention is low across the entire force. 
Military provided housing is an incentive often thought to assist retention; 
however, as Hansen and Koopman (2005) point out, “service members [on average] 
value housing less than it costs the military to provide it.”  This means that the provision 
of military housing may not be cost effective, making basic pay, despite its shortfalls 
discussed above, a superior incentive to housing.  Additionally, like basic pay, military 
housing is provided to all service members at a standard commensurate with their rank 
and family status.  This means that improvements in housing standards are likely to have 
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an impact on retention across the force, not just where the manning shortages exist.  
Military housing is therefore a very expensive retention tool. 
The SRB as a retention tool has advantages over both basic pay and housing in 
terms of its flexibility.  If a certain area has manning shortages as result of poor 
reenlistment, the SRB can be directed at that skill with minimal interference to other 
areas.  Budgets for SRBs are allocated to each service, which means that the approval 
process is far simpler than Defense-wide base pay increases or housing improvements.  
Finally, the fact that SRBs are targeted at areas with insufficient reenlistments makes this 
a more cost effective use of resources.  For this reason, the services consider the SRB to 
be more appropriate than other retention incentive methods.     
F. RECRUITMENT VS. RETENTION 
Several studies have looked at the SRB return on investment in the U.S. Navy; 
one study was completed by Cylke et al. (n.d.) and another by Hansen and Wenger 
(2003).  These studies center on the idea that high retention levels reduce the enlistment 
necessary, which results in fewer training and recruitment expenses.    
Cylke et al. did a cost benefit analysis of two strategies: 
• Low SRB, which resulted in lower retention rate and a greater number of 
recruits and trainees needed. 
• High SRB, which resulted in higher retention and therefore lower numbers 
of recruits and trainees needed. 
In the cost benefit analysis, the benefits included cost avoidance (avoided training 
and recruiting costs) and the costs were the actual SRB payments.  They found that 
whether the SRB was beneficial depends on the career field.  For example, the cost of 
recruiting and training sailors is very high in the IT field; therefore, it is more cost 
effective to retain more service members using the SRB.  But in other trades, where 
recruiting and training costs are lower, it is more cost effective to recruit more, with the 
expectation of losing a greater percentage but still achieving long-term manning goals.   
Hansen and Wenger (2003) wanted to establish whether the U.S. Navy, through 
its use of SRBs, was retaining too many people to be cost effective.  A general consensus 
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existed that greater retention was better for the service, as it meant less recruiting and 
training costs and a more experienced and productive workforce.  The study showed that 
this idea is not necessarily true.  They found that it was beneficial to increase retention 
(and therefore SRB levels) in only a small number of skills.  However, in the majority of 
skills, they found that the Navy could make significant savings by reducing the SRB 
level, accepting lower retention and increasing recruiting to compensate for the lower 
retention levels.    
The determination from these two studies is that the SRB is not always the answer 
to manning deficiencies.  There is a point up to which retention (and the associated 
bonuses with that retention) is cost effective, but beyond this the service would be better 
off recruiting and training more people.   
G. LUMP SUM VERSUS ANNUAL INSTALLMENT SRB 
As part of his thesis while studying at the Naval Postgraduate School, Ross (2000) 
looked at the then Marine Corps policy of paying SRBs in installments.  He concluded 
that “zone A1 first-term Marine retention will increase between 6.8 % and 11.7 % if the 
SRB payments were made in lump sum.”  His findings centered on the fact that 
individual personal discount rates (PDR) are higher than the government discount rate.   
Hattiangadi et al. (2004) explain the PDR: 
The personal discount rate answers the question: how much would my 
dollar have to be reduced today so that I am indifferent between receiving 
that reduced amount today and receiving a dollar one year from now? The 
reduction (in percentage terms) is the personal discount rate. 
A high discount rate is associated with a present-oriented person (Ehrenberg & 
Smith, 2006); that is, they have a preference for current consumption rather than future 
consumption.  Ross’ research highlighted that there are many influences on a PDR, but 
that young enlisted males were likely to have high discount rates.  He observed that 
young enlisted men who have loans for new cars prefer current consumption (the new 
                                                 
1 Zone A - reenlistments occurring between 21 months and 6 years of service 
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car) despite the fact that the loan will cost more than the present value of the car in the 
long run.   
When an individual’s PRD is higher than the federal government’s discount rate, 
both the service and the individual benefit from making SRB payments up front.  For the 
individual, the up front payment is valued more highly; for the service, the up front 
payment is more cost effective, meaning that the same level of retention can be achieved 
with smaller bonuses. 
The USMC made the switch to paying SRBs in lump sums in fiscal year 2001.  
Even though the literature shows that lump sum SRBs have a larger effect on 
reenlistments than annual installments, the other services continue paying 50% of the 
SRB upfront and 50% in anniversary payments.  In fiscal year 2003, it is estimated that 
the former system of anniversary payments in the Marine Corps would have cost at least 
$8 million more (representing 30% of the zone A SRB budget) to achieve the same level 
of zone A retention (Hattiangadi et al., 2004).   
H. COULD BE MORE EFFICIENT 
One of the drawbacks of the SRB process noted by Hansen and Koopman (2005) 
is that the service can not identify those who would have reenlisted without the presence 
of the bonus.  It is for this reason that bonuses are paid equitably to all service members 
in an eligible category.  The result is that many are “over paid,” as the enticement is 
above the minimum they would have accepted to reenlist.  This reduces the cost 
effectiveness of the bonus, particularly when the retention level of the skill was already 
high and the service wanted to raise it further.   
North (1994) calculated the Marine Corps’ costs of securing higher reenlistment 
levels using zone A SRBs.  He demonstrated that while reenlistment rates increase with 
higher SRB multiples, the cost of each additional reenlistment also increases.  This is 
because Marines who are willing to reenlist with a lower SRB are paid additional money 
to make the bonus equitable.  
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Figure 4 demonstrates the idea.  A simplistic reenlistment supply curve is plotted, 
indicating the various levels of reenlistment achievable (horizontal axis) at given levels of 
compensation (vertical axis).  At a compensation level of C1 where no bonus is paid, R1 
people are willing to supply labor by reenlisting.  If the service wished to increase 
reenlistments to R2, it would not be possible without increasing the compensation level.  
The bonus in the graph takes the total level of compensation to C2. 
 
Figure 4.   Compensation at different reenlistment levels [After Figure 12 of Hattiangadi 
et al., 2004] 
 
Instead of the bonus being paid to just those additional people enticed to reenlist, 
the bonus is paid to all those who reenlist.  The shaded area below the reenlistment 
supply line in Figure 4 represents the additional payments required to increase retention 
from R1 to R2; the shaded area above the reenlistment supply line is the additional 
payment required because all service members receive the same bonus.  To ensure there 
is equity in compensation across a given skill, the cost of inducing the additional 
reenlistments by the bonus is the entire shaded area.   
Compensation 
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The costs of inducing another reenlistment are higher when reenlistment rates 
(without a bonus) are already high.  Graphically, this is demonstrated by the shaded area 
to the left of R1 (essentially the resources wasted); this area grows faster as there are 
more people in this group.  
I. FLOW ON EFFECT IN LATER YEARS 
Offering an SRB as a one-off measure to increase reenlistments does not 
necessarily fix a long-term retention problem in a particular area.  As Goldberg (2001) 
and Hansen and Koopman (2005) point out, those retained at the first decision point 
because of the bonus have a relatively low preference for military life since they would 
have left the service without the bonus.  Therefore, in the absence of a bonus, 
reenlistment rates are likely to be worse at subsequent decision points than historical data 
suggests.  As these cohorts move through the system, the retention problem is likely to 
shift to a different rank and seniority level unless further bonuses are offered.  Once 
started, there is no easy solution to ceasing reenlistment bonuses without accepting future 
manning shortages. 
J. LACK OF PRECISENESS OF THE SRB 
The SRB multiple chosen is a vital element of the SRB payment.  The multiples 
are restricted to half numbers; however, the difference between the dollar value of an 
SRB multiple of 3 and 3.5, for example, could be quite large.  Consider a member who 
has a base pay of $2,000 per month and wishes to reenlist for 4 more years: 
Multiple of 3:   $ SRB = $2,000 x multiple 3 x 3 years =  $24,000 
Multiple of 3.5 $ SRB = $2,000 x multiple 3.5 x 3 years =  $28,000 
This $4,000 gap is far from insignificant.  A number of people will likely change 
their reenlistment decision for this sum of money.  Statistical models can predict the 
necessary multiple; however, they can never be 100% accurate.  Suppose 1,000 soldiers 
chose to reenlist for a multiple of 3.5 when a multiple of 3 would have been sufficient to 
retain the 900 service members required.  The resource wastage in this example is $6.4 
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million ($4,000 overpayment to each of the 900 targeted reenlistments plus $28,000 to 
each of the 100 service members over the target), not to mention the additional costs of 
salary, housing and other costs associated with additional soldiers.  On the other hand, an 
incorrectly predicted SRB multiple could leave the service short of many needed soldiers.    
K. SUMMARY 
The SRB system has proven to be a highly effective reenlistment tool in the U.S. 
Military.  The system, although modified, has existed for more than 40 years and has 
been used increasingly in recent years.  There is little doubt that it is the most effective 
tool for increasing retention within the U.S. Military.  
The time of payment has a significant effect on the retention effect of a bonus, a 
fact that the Marine Corps has recognized.  The Australian Army could benefit from this 
knowledge, as its completion bonus component of the AERRB is paid at the end of the 
service term rather than as an upfront payment for a set contract length.  Australia’s 
deferred payment is less effective than the U.S. services who continue paying yearly 
installments of 50% of the bonus. 
Despite its cost effectiveness compared to other retention strategies, there are still 
inefficiencies with the SRB.  Many people are paid to reenlist who would have done so 
willingly without the bonus or with a smaller bonus.  Additionally, the SRB multiple 
creates a several thousand dollar gap between even the smallest multiple increments, 
meaning that the bonus could be either excessively costly or miss the intended retention 
target.  It is therefore not just the Australian Army that needs a more accurate method of 
determining the level of retention bonus.   
The next chapter looks at an alternative method of establishing a bonus amount.  
The accuracy it provides in establishing a monetary retention bonus could have benefits 






IV. AUCTION THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Recent theses at the Naval Postgraduate School have considered using auctions to 
administer the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) in the United States Navy.  Filip 
(2006), Norton (2007) and Bock (2007) all looked at the use of a sealed-bid, second-price 
auction as a more cost effective means than the extant system.  This chapter will explore 
the auction concept in further detail, first discussing the theory and the various auction 
processes.   
B. WHAT IS AN AUCTION? 
An auction is a system of selling goods or services, where the price is set by bids 
placed by the market participants.  A variety of auctions are used in the market place and 
these are discussed in this chapter.  Auctions are used extensively in the product market 
but rarely used in the labor market.   
As previously outlined, this thesis considers applying auctions to military 
retention bonuses—that is, payments for an agreement to provide additional service.  To 
do so, this chapter explains some of the different auction designs, including the English, 
Dutch, and the first and second price sealed-bid auction. When considering these auction 
mechanisms, it is of particular interest as to how they could be applied in a closed labor 
market, specifically for retention bonuses offered to Army personnel for a set period of 
service. Therefore, the second part of the chapter focuses on the ideal auction for 
determining retention bonus levels and how theoretically valuable the outcome might be. 
C. FORWARD AND REVERSE AUCTIONS 
Auctions can be classified as either forward or reverse.  The number of buyers 




A forward auction is normal in a product market where there is a single seller and 
multiple people hoping to buy the product.  The winner in this type of auction is the 
person willing to pay the seller the highest price. 
2. Reverse  
A reverse auction is the opposite; there is one buyer and multiple sellers 
competing to provide the item.  The winner in a reverse auction is the person willing to 
provide the item at the lowest cost to the buyer.  This is the type of auction often used 
when companies are vying to win a government contract to provide a service.   
When determining whether a forward or reverse auction is applicable to military 
retention bonuses, it is important to consider that militaries operate in what is essentially 
a closed labor market.  The “sellers” are the pool of eligible serving personnel willing to 
continue to serve at the right price.  While there are other possible buyers of former 
soldiers (civilian industry), there is arguably only one buyer in the market to employ 
soldiers to be soldiers.  With one buyer and multiple sellers, it is clear from the earlier 
definition that a reverse auction is appropriate for this internal labor market.  The winning 
bidders will be those willing to commit to a further period of service at the lowest costs.   
The next section describes different available auction mechanisms.  Although a 
reverse auction is most applicable to this study, the auctions below are described in terms 
of a forward auction in the product market for simplicity.  Later, the reverse auction 
application in the labor market will be explored in further detail. 
D. AUCTION DESIGNS 
1. English Auction 
An English auction is the design with which people are usually most familiar.  It 
is commonly used in Australia in many circumstances, including the sale of real estate, 
livestock, and motor vehicles.  In an English auction, the bidders interact directly with 
each other in stages (Campbell, 2006).  Someone starts by bidding for the item; other 
 31
potential buyers can increase that bid by agreeing to a higher price proposed by the 
auctioneer.  Individuals can each bid many times as the price for the item increases.  The 
auction ends when there is only one potential buyer remaining and no one else is willing 
to raise the bid.  The last person remaining wins the auction and pays the price of the 
winning bid for the product/service sold.  There are several mediums through which an 
English auction can be conducted, including in person or online.  Regardless of the 
medium, however, potential buyers always know the current highest bid as the auction 
progresses.   
2. Dutch Auction 
Dutch auctions originated in the Netherlands as a mechanism for selling flowers.  
Normally all prospective buyers are physically present at the auction.  Unlike the English 
auction, which starts at a low price, the Dutch auction starts at a very high price.  The 
price is then gradually lowered until a bidder declares they will take it.  There is only one 
bid in this auction, and that is the first person to call out.  The winner purchases the 
product/service for the price to which the auction has fallen.  The Dutch auction has a 
“game” aspect to it; the bidder wants to bid as low as possible to maximize their gain; 
however, they must take into account the probability that competing buyers will bid as 
they wait for the price to fall further (Vickrey, 1961).     
3. Sealed-Bid Auctions  
The two auctions described above are both open auctions, which take place at a 
set time in a set place with all bidders represented and bids made openly.  In contrast, 
sealed bid auctions may occur over a period of weeks or months and do not require 
potential buyers’ physical presence.  In a sealed bid auction, potential buyers submit just 
one bid, which is normally done in writing.  Potential buyers make their bid without 
knowing how competitors value the item or observing any competing bids.  There are 
two types of sealed bid auctions: 
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a. First Price 
This is the most common form of sealed-bid auction and is often referred 
to as a “silent auction.”  Potential buyers submit written tenders and the winner is the 
highest bidder, paying the value of their bid for the product/service.  As there is only one 
opportunity to bid, a potential buyer can not observe his/her competitors and potentially 
increase the bid, as in an English auction.  Potential buyers are presented with the 
dilemma of trying to maximize individual gain by bidding low while still trying to win 
the auction with the highest bid.  The optimal bidding strategy in this form of auction is 
to bid below the true maximum price the bidder is willing to pay.  
b. Second Price  
A second price auction, or “Vickrey auction” named after its founder 
William Vickrey, is less common than a first price auction.  It is similar to a first price 
auction in that prospective buyers bid once without observing any bids from competing 
individuals.  The difference is that the highest bidder wins the auction but pays the value 
of the second highest bid for the product/service.  This aspect makes a second price 
auction “truth revealing;” that is, the optimum strategy for the buyer is to honestly bid the 
amount they value the good or service. 
E. CHOICE OF MECHANISM 
The choice of a specific auction mechanism depends on many factors.  In terms of 
the financial return to the seller, each auction form yields on average the same result 
(McAfee & McMillan, 1987).  The Dutch and first-price auctions have some 
commonalities, as do the English and second-price auctions.  When comparing, the 
forward auction will be used. 
Campbell (2006) demonstrates that a Dutch and a sealed-bid, first-price auction 
are outcome equivalent.  Like the Dutch auction, when potential buyers bid in a first price 
auction they have essentially no knowledge of the value others place on the item.  Buyers 
of a product in a sealed-bid, first-price auction want to bid as low as possible to maximize 
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their individual gain; however, bidding low increases the chance that a competing buyer 
will outbid them.  The buyer in both auctions guesses the possible strategy of competing 
buyers so that they can win the auction while capturing the maximum possible individual 
gain.  The effect is that potential buyers typically bid a price less than their true valuation 
(McAfee & McMillan, 1987).  
Likewise, Campbell (2006) shows that the outcomes of an English and a Vickrey 
(sealed-bid, second-price) auction are equivalent in that the winner would pay the seller 
the same amount with either mechanism.  In an English auction, the bidding stops at a 
level just higher than the second highest bidder, despite the fact that the winner would be 
willing to bid higher if necessary.  The winner therefore pays an amount close to the 
second highest bidder, thereby making it equivalent to the Vickrey auction.   
F. AUCTIONS POSSIBLE FOR MILITARY RETENTION BONUSES 
Earlier, a reverse auction was illustrated to be appropriate for retention bonuses in 
the closed military labor market.  The ideal design of the reverse auction, however, is not 
as obvious.  The uniqueness of a military internal labor market means that certain auction 
designs would not be practical.  The disbursement of service personnel throughout the 
world, either through training or operational commitments, essentially rules out a 
traditional English auction or a Dutch auction.  Even using the Internet, the practicalities 
of having those eligible for a bonus online at the same time rules out an open auction. 
From a practical point of view, a sealed bid auction would be more appropriate, 
be it a first or second price auction.  The next section looks at both types in a reverse 
auction format appropriate to a military retention bonus.  Before doing so, however, it is 
important to understand the concept of reservation value, as this will be discussed 
throughout this section.   
Reservation Value.  An individual facing the decision whether to continue to 
serve must consider their civilian and military opportunities in terms of preference and 
compensation.  An individual who likes the service life may, for example, be prepared to 
receive $5,000 less per annum than for equivalent work in civilian industry.  On the other 
hand, a person who dislikes the service life may be prepared to leave the service even if 
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they were paying $10,000 more than he could make in a civilian job.  A reservation value 
combines both taste for continual service with opportunity cost of civilian employment, 
and gives it a dollar value.  This reservation value represents the minimum sum of money 
for which, if paid by the military, the person would continue their military service.   Each 
individual has a different reservation value, as they have different tastes and civilian 
opportunities.   
1. First Price Auction 
In a first price reverse auction, the winner is paid the value of their bid.  Figure 5 
is an example of how different soldiers may bid.  If eight out of ten soldiers need to be 
retained in this first price auction, each would receive a different bonus ranging from 
$2,500 to $7,750.  In theory, this auction is efficient, meaning that the service does not 
overcompensate those willing to stay in the service for lesser amounts of money.  While 
this may appear attractive to the service, inequitable compensation for similarly skilled 
individuals may be difficult for the service member to digest, resulting in tension and 
morale problems in the ranks.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Example – possible bids for a Military Retention Bonus  
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It is also important to remember that the dominant strategy of the first price is to 
bid above the reservation value.  In particular, each individual will try to estimate the bid 
submitted by the first rejected participant, hoping to keep their bid just below this value; 
this will enable them to win the auction while maximizing their surplus value.  The 
bidding curve illustrated in Figure 5 (above) is therefore likely to be above that if 
members were bidding truthfully.   
Figure 6 below shows a possible individual valuation (in pink) against the actual 
bid.  The expectation is that bid inflation is larger for those who have a lower opportunity 
cost and smaller for participants closer to the margin where their bid may be rejected.  
The inability to control untruthful bidding means that the service can not learn about the 
true value that service members place on their service.  .   
 
Figure 6.   Example – possible bids for a Military Retention Bonus compared to an 
individuals true valuation 
 
 36
2. Second Price Auction 
In a second price reverse auction, the winner has the lowest bid but is paid the 
amount equal to the first losing bid.  Figure 7 presents an example of soldiers’ bids for a 
retention bonus in a second price auction.  Under the same circumstances as the previous 
example, bids should reflect individual reservation values.   
Using the example depicted in Figure 7, if the Army wanted to retain eight 
soldiers, they would be paid $8,000 (the value of the first losing bid being the ninth 
person), despite the fact that all eight soldiers were prepared to reenlist for less than this 
amount.   
 
Figure 7.   Example – cost of retaining eight soldiers in a second price auction, example in 
Figures 5 and 6 
 
As mentioned earlier, the second price auction is “truth revealing;” there is no 
other bidding strategy that could make an individual better off than to bid the actual value 
that it is worth to them.  If participants bid higher than their reservation value and are 
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among the winning bidders, the bonus paid does not increase, as they are paid the value 
of the first losing bid.  A higher bid only increases the risk of walking away empty 
handed, when in truth the person would have accepted a lower bonus.  There is no 
incentive to bidding below the reservation value because the individual might be retained 
when civilian opportunities would presumably make the person better off.  If a person 
honestly bids their reservation value and is one of the winners, they would be paid more 
than their bid.  Therefore, the best strategy to maximize an individual’s expected gain is 
to bid their reservation value.   
G. THE BEST AUCTION 
It is likely that a first price auction would save the Army at least some money in 
retention bonuses.  The savings come as a result of inequity in compensation among 
similarly skilled individuals.  The problem with inequitable compensation is the likely 
morale backlash caused.  It is extremely difficult to place a monetary figure on morale (or 
the loss thereof); however, a fighting force is usually ineffective without it.  Therefore, it 
is extremely unlikely that a first-price auction would be viewed as acceptable from either 
the service or service-member’s point of view.   
Additionally, the bids in a first price auction are influenced by an individual’s 
attitude toward risk.  The risk-averse person may bid at or slightly above their reservation 
value, whereas another person with a high risk tolerance may bid much higher.  The 
advantage of the second price auction is that attitude to risk should not influence a 
rational bid. 
Finally, the truth revealing nature of a second price auction allows the service to 
gather information about an individual bidder’s opportunity costs.  An individual who has 
a high opportunity cost is likely to bid high, as they have more lucrative civilian 
opportunities should they leave the Army.  An individual with fewer or lower paying 
civilian opportunities is more likely to want to stay in the Army and consequently bid 
lower.  The data gathered, therefore, provides important information to the service on 
how its soldiers value their employment, which could be useful in subsequent pay 
reviews or in forecasting future bonus costs.  
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In summary, while a first price auction might be a cheaper option, it is unlikely to 
be viable.  The second price auction offers several advantages which makes it a superior 
mechanism.   
H. SECOND PRICE AUCTION LIMITATIONS 
Despite the benefits offered by a second price auction, there are some specific 
limitations in their use with military retention bonuses.  First, when manning shortages 
are so significant that all personnel in a given category need to be retained, the second 
price auction may not be as efficient as described earlier.  If participants understand the 
extent of the manning shortage and suspect that all personnel need to be retained, they 
would lose the incentive to bid their true valuation.  Further analysis would be necessary 
to establish whether a pre-determined bonus, using prediction techniques such as those 
currently used within the U.S. Military, would be cheaper to retain all personnel. 
Collusion is also possible and likely to be a factor in auctions with few 
participants.  The Australian Army, being a smaller organization than any of the U.S. 
services, is more likely to experience collusion.  In small and highly specialized cohorts, 
where all personnel are stationed in the same location, an influential person could 
encourage participants to bid higher than their individual reservation value, again 
resulting in overpayments.  An analysis as to the effect of collusion on bidding behavior 
is therefore important.  If collusion was deemed to effect bidding behavior, the service 
would then need to weigh the possibility of overpayment to retain the right number of 
people against the possibility of retaining insufficient numbers with a cheaper pre-
determined bonus. 
Finally, introducing an auction process is likely to be difficult.  A second price 
auction is not familiar to the average person, which makes training necessary before an 
auction is conducted.  An online or electronic learning package would be appropriate, 
given that participants would be spread throughout the country.  Although initially 
expensive to develop, the theory of the second price auction does not change, meaning 
that the training package should be a one-off expense. 
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I. CONCLUSION 
A reverse auction is appropriate when conducting an auction to determine military 
retention bonuses.  Practicalities of conducting the auction make either a first or second 
price sealed-bid auction the most feasible options. Of the two, the second price auction is 
the superior process due to its truth revealing nature and the fact a participant’s risk 
tolerance does not affect their bid.  Additionally, the data that could be gathered from the 
second price auction would be more valuable to the service than that of the first price.  
Although the process has its limitations and may not be appropriate in all circumstances, 
the benefits of using an auction in other cases is expected to return the Army significant 
cost savings over the current process of determining the necessary bonus amount.  At the 
same time, an auction to determine a retention bonus returns the exact number of soldiers 
necessary, something that is highly unlikely with the extant process. 
The next chapter introduces a labor market second-price auction experiment, 
designed to validate the theoretical concepts discussed. 
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V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2007, Dr. William Gates and Dr. Peter Coughlan of the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) conducted experiments using a second-price sealed bid 
auction.  The experiment was of a sequential and two-stage format, designed to be more 
efficient than just a single second price auction.  Major William Norton, a former student 
of NPS explains the experimental setup of the auction in detail in his 2006 master’s 
thesis.  To assist explaining the experiment, Sections B-D of this chapter rely heavily on 
the content of Chapter V of Norton’s thesis. 
B. EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW 
1. Purpose and Design 
The goal of the experiment was to test whether an individual would reveal the true 
value they place on alternate employment.  It isolated salary as the primary motivator for 
choice of employment between two generic firms, Firm A and Firm B.  While “not 
military-specific by design, the experiment was intended to simulate the decisions a 
service-member would make under uncertain conditions” (Norton, 2006).  The 
experiment had an Initial Salary Survey, which asks subjects for a salary bid for one year 
of employment, and a Second Salary Survey, where subjects make a salary bid for five 
years of employment.  Only those successful in the initial survey progress to the second 
survey.   
The two stage sequential design of the experiment acknowledges that employees 
in an organization may differ in their willingness to continue employment.  Often, this 
difference is a result of their abilities and therefore alternate employment options.  More 
capable employees generally have a greater number of more lucrative employment 
opportunities, thereby requiring larger salaries to retain them.  Conversely, those with 
fewer employment options may value longer term employment for less salary.  By having 
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options for a short and long-term contract, the firm can more easily identify those with 
better employment opportunities.  Doing this allows them to contract those with fewer 
employment options and pay them less, thereby saving the firm money.    
2. Scenario 
Subjects in the experiment are initially one of one hundred employees at Firm A 
making an employment decision in uncertain conditions.  In the scenario, Firm A is 
downsizing, with ten employees to be laid off in the first year.  In subsequent years, 
further layoffs will occur; however, the exact number is uncertain at this stage. 
For the controlled experiment, the only other option for employees is to work for 
Firm B, who has offered to employ all former employees of Firm A.  Subjects have no 
preference for either firm and can make the transition to Firm B immediately or at any 
stage in the next five years.  Once the transition to Firm B is made, they cannot return to 
Firm A.  The subject’s goal is to maximize their total income for the next five years. 
C. INITIAL SALARY SURVEY 
The initial survey instructions are included in Appendix A.  In the scenario, Firm 
B presents a confidential salary offer to all Firm A employees.  Subjects know that offers 
to other employees are evenly and randomly spread across an unknown range, and they 
do not know the value of other offers.  Firm A asks employees to specify the minimum 
annual salary necessary to remain at Firm A.  As Firm A will retain 90 of its 100 
employees for the year, subjects are told that they will lay off those who submit the ten 
highest salary requests.  Those laid off are immediately employed at Firm B and paid the 
amount offered by Firm B, with the remaining 90 employees remaining at Firm A for at 
least one more year. 
The 90 employees to remain at Firm A will be paid the lowest salary requested by 
the ten laid off employees, or stated differently, the tenth highest salary request.  
Therefore, the salary paid to winners of the auction is always higher than the bid that they 
submitted.  This is what characterizes the survey as a second price auction, with the 
subjects being the sellers of labor to Firm A, the single buyer.   
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Those employees who submitted the ten highest bids are not retained at Firm A.  
Instead, they shift employment to Firm B and are paid the amount of the initial salary 
offer for the next five years.  In the experiment, the subject would be directed to 
information included in Appendix B, where they would be informed of their total five 
year income. 
D. SECOND SALARY SURVEY 
Subjects who win the first survey (i.e., among the 90 lowest bids) are directed to 
instructions for the second salary survey contained in Appendix C.  They are told that 
they will be employed at Firm A for the next year and paid a salary equal to the tenth 
highest bid.  Having previously been told that Firm A would lay off additional workers in 
subsequent years, the subject is now provided an estimation of the layoff percentage.   
Subjects are then given information to assist them in calculating the expected 
value of their annual salary in the next five years.  The information is presented in a table 
similar to Table 1.  In this example, the subject was informed of a 30% layoff probability.  
The original Firm B offer was $90,000.  As they were among the winning bidders of the 
first salary survey, the subject would be paid $142,466 in the first year (the bid of the 
tenth highest bidder of the first survey).  While they are guaranteed to work for Firm A 
for at least one year, the table shows the other possible employment patterns in the five 
year period.  Pattern 1 shows the income if subject is laid off at the end of the first year, 









Table 1.   Salary possibility example by employment pattern using a 30% layoff 
probability with “high” information 
 
Some subjects in the experiment are given more information than others.  
Specifically, those with a ‘high’ amount of information are presented a probability of 
each employment pattern occurring (shown as the first row in Table 1), whereas those 
with ‘low’ information are not.  In the example, Pattern 1 shows that if a person was 
retained for one year at Firm A, they have a 30% chance of layoff for the second year 
(i.e., 70% chance of retention).  Likewise, Pattern 2 shows that if they stayed with Firm A 
for two years (an event that has a 70% chance of occurring), with a 30% chance of layoff 
of those remaining, the probability of the employment pattern occurring is 21% (30% of 
70% = 21%).  The subjects given a ‘high’ level of information are provided instructions 
on how to calculate the “expected” annual salary over the five year period, and given the 
result of that calculation.  The expected annual salary is a weighted average of the 
average annual salary presented in the bottom row of the table  Other subjects with a 
“low” amount of information are not provided this detail.     
A second salary survey then takes place, where subjects bid for a five year 
employment contract.  In the scenario, Firm A will give a five year employment 




employees to specify the annual salary they would need to remain with Firm A for the 
next five years.  This survey determines which of the 45 employees are retained on a five 
year contract and their annual salary.   
The second salary survey is much like the first salary survey in that the 45 
employees who submit the lowest bid are given the employment guarantee.  In the 
experiment, these subjects are directed to instructions at appendix D, which provides the 
value of the 45th highest salary request, or stated differently, the first losing bid.  Winners 
of the contract are paid this sum annually for five years.   
Those who submit bids above the 50th percentile are not necessarily stood down; 
instead, their continued employment at Firm A is based on the five probable employment 
patterns.  Subjects are directed to instructions in Appendix E, where the experiment 
allocates an employment pattern based on the probabilities previously discussed.  
Subjects are then provided the five year total income from the sum of the annual salaries 
while working for either Firm A or B.   
E. MOTIVATION 
To ensure realism in bids, subjects in the experiment were paid an “experimental 
income.”  The concept was that if real dollars were at stake for superior performance, 
subjects in the experiment would bid to maximize their experimental income, as would 
occur in reality if employees were bidding for their salary.  As Norton (2006) states, “The 
promise of real money is a strong motivator in this experiment.”   
Payment was based on the value of the subject’s total earnings over 18 rounds.  
Budgetary constraints and the number of experiment participants determined the 
exchange rate used.  Subjects were paid $1 for every $450,000 earned in the experiment.   
F. APPLICATION TO THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 
Design norms for economics experiments require a context free environment, so 
participants are motivated by the incentives built into the experiment rather that 
preconceived notions of how they should behave.  Although the experiment focuses on 
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the employment decisions between two non-military firms, the decisions made in the 
experiment can be applied to employment decisions of a service person.  The designers of 
the experiment, both employed by the U.S. Navy, clearly had a U.S. Military application 
in mind when creating the scenario.  As a result, the experiment is extremely applicable 
to the employment decisions that U.S. Military personnel face today.  While U.S. and 
Australian forces have many policy differences, the experiment also has a useful 
application for the Australian Army. 
To draw an application to the Australian Army, one must first draw parallels to 
the two firms in the experiment.  If the Army was to use the experiment, its role is 
represented by Firm A, while the experimental subjects (or Firm A employees) would be 
the soldiers.  The salary bid made by experimental subjects would represent a soldier 
making a bid for either a pay rise or a retention bonus.  Firm B would represent 
employers in civil industry making job offers to soldiers in an attempt to lure them from 
the service.  Table 2 and Table 3 draw parallels between the experiment and the 
Australian Army for both the first and second salary survey. 
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Table 2.   Experiment parallels to the Australian Army – first salary survey 
 
Experiment Apply to Australian Army 
Firm A downsizing in the 
next five years, laying off 
10% of workforce in the first 
year 
The Australian Army is upsizing, but currently does not 
need to retain every soldier to do so.  The Army needs to 
increase retention rates, but not make them 100%.  For 
example, retention in a particular category may be 85% 
per year, but to meet future manning requirements, it 
may need to increase to 90%.  The fact that it doesn’t 
want to keep 100% makes this experimental condition 
appropriate.   
Firm A will lay off additional 
employees in future years, but 
the exact number is uncertain 
(uncertainty is important to 
induce truthful bidding 
behavior) 
The Army does not know the exact retention rate 
necessary in subsequent years, as it depends on 
discharges and resignations throughout the year, 
particularly from those who continued to serve without 
contractual obligations.   
The uncertainty in the experiment could also represent 
uncertainty about future bonus offers. 
Firm B offers a salary but 
other employees don’t know 
the value of the salary 
The Firm B offer represents the service members civilian 
sector options, which likely vary across individuals.  The 
Australian Army is small by U.S. Military standards.  In 
selected specialist trades (for example dentists), it could 
be possible for all cohort members know one another.  In 
small cohorts such as this, collusion could be a problem.  
However, in cases such as the AERRB where hundreds 
or people are eligible for a bonus, effective collusion is 
highly unlikely.   
Firm A lays off the ten 
highest bidders 
Current Australian Army policies would make it highly 
unlikely for losers of the auction to be laid off.  However, 
it is highly likely that those not given a bonus would 
leave the service soon after.  This is because if soldiers 
bid their true reservation value and it was sufficiently 
high to not receive a bonus, their civilian opportunities 
should be better.  Any future service that the soldier 
provides would likely be short-term as they secure 
employment with a civilian firm.   
Firm A retains 90 lowest 
bidders for the next year 
In the example previously discussed where existing 
retention rates were 85%, the Army would then retain an 
additional 5% more than they would have otherwise.  
This has a secondary effect of reducing the workload of 
those who had previously been covering a vacancy and 
claim to have been “over worked and under paid.”  These 
people, with a lower workload, may be more willing to 
remain in the Army for longer, thereby improving 
retention in subsequent years.   
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Table 3.   Experiment parallels to the Australian Army – second salary survey 
Experiment Apply to Australian Army 
Firm A says they are going to lay 
off a certain percentage of 
workforce in future years 
The Australian Army does not need to retain 
100% of current serving soldiers, even with force 
expansion; however, the exact retention levels in 
subsequent years will change as a result of 
discharges and the number of people retained 
without bonus in the previous year.  Therefore, 
the number of people who may be offered a 
bonus in subsequent years may differ.  This can 
also reflect uncertainty about future bonus offers. 
Firm A randomly selects those to be 
laid off. 
This aspect of the experiment is difficult to apply 
to the Australian Army.  The Army is unlikely to 
randomly select those it wants to retain, instead 
making posting and promotion possibilities better 
for those it wants to keep.  These things have 
been demonstrated to effect a member’s retention 
decision.   
It could be said, however, that the number of 
soldiers to be offered a bonus is unknown due to 
retention levels and budgetary constraints.   
Firm A gives a five year 
employment guarantee to the half of 
the employees who are the lowest 
bidders for the five year contract 
An employment guarantee is of no incentive to 
members of the Australian Army as they already 
have it – as long as they continue to provide 
effective service, they can continue to serve until 
retirement age (although they may not get the 
jobs and the promotion opportunities of the better 
performers).   
 
However, a guarantee that they will receive a 
bonus for five years would be attractive if there is 
uncertainty as to how many the Army needs to 
retain in future years and uncertainty in the 
budget for future retention bonuses. 
Those who don’t get the 
employment guarantee continue to 
work for at least one year, with a 
given probability of being laid off 
in any of the upcoming years 
Those who didn’t win the five year bonus 
guarantee could continue to serve on yearly 
contracts.  The bonus availability would then 
depend on the budget and separation rates in that 





The experiment conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in September 2007 is 
useful for the Australian Army to learn about the possible use of second price auctions to 
determine retention bonuses.  While good parallels to the Australian Army can be drawn 
in the first salary survey, it is slightly more difficult to do so in the second salary survey.  
Regardless, as a learning platform, the experiment is useful and may provide a platform 
on which to base future experiments in the field. 
 50
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 51
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter introduced the two-stage second price auction experiment 
conducted by Dr. William Gates and Dr. Peter Coughlan in 2007.  The experiment had 
subjects initially bid for a one year salary at Firm A, with the firm laying off the 10 
highest bidders out of a sample of 100.  Those successful in the first salary survey were 
given the opportunity to bid for a five year contract at Firm A, offered to the 45 lowest 
bidders in the second salary survey.  This chapter discusses the sample and the results of 
both the first and second salary survey. 
B. SAMPLE 
The experiment was conducted using 71 subjects from the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School and the U.S. Defense Language Institute.  Each subject participated 
in 18 trials, thereby giving 1278 observations in the experiment sample.  In the sample, 
the largest demographic group represented was a male enlisted person who had served 
less than five years in the military.  Approximately 56% of the total sample had served 
less than five years.  Females made up almost 13% of the sample, and while this may 
seem small, it approximates the proportion of women who currently serve in both the US 




Figure 8.   Employment category of experiment participants 
 
 




Figure 10.   Years of experience of experiment participants 
 
The sample was restricted to 70 subjects (1260 trials) as one subject was a clear 
outlier.  This participant appeared to lose interest midway through the experiment, 
bidding either excessively high or low amounts, perhaps in an attempt to finish the 
experiment quickly.  As the participant’s bids were inconsistent with the rest of the 
sample, these observations were removed. 
C. FIRST SALARY SURVEY 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Firm B’s salary offers were randomly generated and were different for each 
experiment trial.  Consequently, an analysis of the bid to remain at Firm A itself carries 
little meaning, as the offer provided by Firm B is different in every trial.  A more 
meaningful statistic to analyze is the individual’s bid as a percentage of his/her 
opportunity cost, which can be easily compared across the sample.  An individual’s 
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opportunity cost is his/her next best alternative, which in this experiment is the salary 
offer presented by Firm B.  The item of interest is therefore: 
Bid from Firm A employeeBid as a Percent of Opportunity Cost =  100
Offer by Firm B
×  
If a subject bids truthfully, as the literature suggests is optimal, this equation should equal 
100%, indicating the subject bid exactly the offer provided by Firm B, or his/her 
opportunity cost. 
The behavior of participants in the first salary survey varied.  The histogram in 
Figure 11 shows the distribution of bids as a percent of opportunity cost.  Of the 1,260 
experimental trials, 141 participants bid the exact opportunity cost, with a further 99 
cases where bids were within one dollar.  These numbers indicated that 19% of the 
sample generally understood the auction’s optimum strategy.  Interestingly, 47% of the 
sample made bids within 5% of the opportunity cost, indicating that just over half of the 
sample was represented in trials where the subject could not determine the optimal 
strategy or chose not to bid in accordance with it.      
 
Figure 11.   Distribution of bids as a percentage of the opportunity cost – first salary survey 
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A summary of the descriptive statistics of the first salary survey are provided in 
Table 4.  The statistics demonstrate what appears to be over bidding, with 65% of the 
sample bidding above the opportunity cost.   
 
Table 4.   Descriptive statistics of the first salary survey – bid as a percent of the 




Standard Deviation 49.1% 
Minimum 0.0% 
Maximum 1,266.9% 
95 % Confidence Interval around the mean 101.8 - 107.1% 
Bid within 5% of Opportunity Cost 47.1% 
Bid at Opportunity Cost 11% 
Bid above Opportunity Cost 65% 
Bid below Opportunity Cost 24% 
 
A t-test of the mean confirms the over bidding to be more than just statistical 
error.  There is overwhelming evidence to suggest subjects bid above their opportunity 
costs.   
2. Regression Analysis 
A regression analysis was conducted to isolate the elements that affect bidding 

















Table 5.   First salary survey regression results 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
 Bid as a % of Opp Cost Bid as a % of Opp Cost 
Round Number -1.455 -1.455 
 (0.264)*** (0.262)*** 
Subject Pool (NPS=1) -0.625 -3.376 
 (2.741) (4.540) 
Years of Service  0.236 
  (0.337) 
Female  -14.378 
  (4.168)*** 
Constant 118.580 120.159 
 (3.133)*** (3.231)*** 
Observations 1260 1260 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
  
 
The number of years a person had served in the military is essentially a proxy for 
age.  Surprisingly, both this and the subject pool (whether a subject was currently at the 
Naval Postgraduate School or the Defense Language Institute) were found to have no 
effect on bidding behavior.   
Gender is a highly significant element in the first salary survey.  The regression 
demonstrates that holding all else constant, females bid 14 percentage points lower than 
their male peers.  Given that the sample mean indicated overbidding of approximately 
4%, this result indicates that the women in the sample tended to underbid in the first 
salary survey. 
Finally, the regression analysis reveals that the round number is highly significant 
and negative.  Holding all else constant, the results indicate that an individual would bid 
approximately 1.5 percentage points lower in each round of the experiment.  In layman’s 
terms, this shows that even though subjects bid on average above the opportunity cost, 
the over bidding decreases in each round.  Remembering that each subject participated in 
18 separate rounds of the experiment, this result demonstrates a powerful learning effect.   
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3. Learning Effect 
Subjects in the experiment were not presented information about the nature of a 
second price auction or its dominant strategy.  Despite the absence of formal instruction, 
subjects received feedback through the salary they achieved at the end of each round, 
highlighting to them the success (or otherwise) of their bidding strategy.  With this 
feedback, one would expect subjects to improve with experience, a hypotheses supported 
by the regression results.  However, the result from the regression of a 1.5% bid reduction 
for each round would imply underbidding in the latter rounds.  This was not the case. 
To understand the rate at which the learning occurs, the bid behavior was 
compiled for each experimental round.  Figure 12 shows the mean and standard deviation 
of the bid across the 18 experimental rounds.     
 





The graph shows that the majority of the learning occurs in the first four rounds; 
beyond that there is very little variation in the mean and standard deviation.  
Underbidding in the latter rounds was not present, and the graph demonstrates the mean 
settling at approximately 100%. 
4. Revision of Sample Mean 
Omitting rounds from the data where learning is occurring has a dramatic effect 
on the experimental results.  Assuming the learning is complete by the end of the 4th 
round, an analysis was conducted on rounds 5 through 18.  Table 6 demonstrates that in 
the latter half of the experiment, subjects bid as the theory suggests.  This result 
demonstrates that after initial learning has occurred in the first four rounds, it is difficult 
to prove that participants bid differently from the dominant strategy. 
 
Table 6.   Descriptive statistic comparison of total sample to experimental rounds 5-
18  of the first salary survey 
 Total Sample Rounds 5-18 
Mean 104.5 99.8 
Standard Deviation 49.1 25.0 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 1266.9 233.4 
95 % Confidence Interval around the mean 101.8 – 107.1 98.2 – 101.3 
t test:  Mean = 1 P value = 0.000 P value = 0.772 
  D. SECOND SALARY SURVEY 
In the experiment scenario, Firm A intended to retain 90 out of 100 employees, 
laying off the employees with the 10 highest bids.  Therefore, depending on the size of 
the bid in the first salary survey, an individual may or may not have an opportunity to bid 
for a five year contract in the second salary survey. 
1. Sample 
Out of the first salary survey of 1260 participants, 1047 were successfully 
retained at Firm A for an additional year, meaning they had an opportunity to bid for a  
 
 59
five year contract in the second salary survey.  Remarkably, there were no major 
differences to the sample representation from the first survey in terms of gender, 
employment category or years of experience.   
The survey did however have a small number of outlying bids that significantly 
affected the mean and standard deviation of the sample.  In particular, a few outlier bids 
were so unreasonable that they seemed to indicate behavior in which the subjects in 
question were not attempting to make the best choice but were simply “testing” or 
“playing” with the experiment software for a trial or two to see what would happen. As a 
consequence, bids in the upper and lower 0.5% were removed from the sample.  This 
restricted the observations analyzed in the second salary survey to 1037. 
The previous chapter highlighted that subjects were presented differing levels of 
information.  The availability of employment pattern probabilities, as well as the means 
of deducing the “expected salary” were the key differences between those presented high 
or low levels of information.  There were an approximately equal number of subjects 
presented low and high levels of information, with 47.3% of the sample presented the 
high information level. 
The previous chapter also indicated that subjects received varying layoff 
probabilities in the second salary survey.  There were three yearly layoff probabilities 
employed in the experiment: 10, 20 and 30%.  Layoff probabilities were equally allocated 
throughout the sample, with approximately one third of the sample allocated to each 
group.   
2. Descriptive Statistics 
Like the first salary survey, analyzing the value of individual bids is of little value 
since salary offers by Firm B (on which participants base their bids) are randomly 
assigned to each experimental trial.  If subjects are risk neutral and bid rationally in 
accordance with the dominant strategy, then their optimal strategy is to bid the 
“expected” value of the annual salary over five years.  Therefore, the most meaningful 
statistic to analyze is an individual’s bid as a percent of expected annual salary, which 
shows the percentage a person overbid or underbid.  The item of interest is therefore: 
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Bid for 5 year salary Bid as a Percent of Expected Annual Salary =  100
Expected Annual Salary
×  
In the above equation, if a risk neutral subject rationally bids the expected annual salary, 
then this equation would equal 100%. 
The behavior of participants in the second salary survey varied more than that of 
the first.  This was expected, as the second salary survey introduced factors such as 
varying layoff probability and varying levels of information about the value of the 
expected future income.  This made the second salary survey more complex than the first, 
which consequently widened the bidding distribution.  The histogram at Figure 13 shows 
the distribution of bids as a percent of their expected annual salary.   
 
Figure 13.   Distribution of bids as a percent of the expected annual salary 
 
The distribution of bids is skewed to the left, resulting in a mean of 90.1% of the 
expected annual salary over five years.  A much smaller number of participants in the 
second survey bid as the literature suggests, where in just 39 of the 1037 trials,  
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participants bid the expected annual salary.  A further three subjects made bids within 
one dollar of the expected value, giving approximately 4% of the sample bidding 
rationally.   
A summary of the descriptive statistics of the second salary survey are provided 
in Table 7.  The statistics demonstrate what appears to be a preference of underbidding, 
where 63% of the bids were below the expected annual salary.   
 
Table 7.   Descriptive statistics in the second salary survey 
Mean 90.1% 
Median 94.7% 
Standard Deviation 25.1% 
Minimum 0.0% 
Maximum 182.7% 
95 % Confidence Interval around the mean  88.5% - 91.6% 
Bid within 1% of Expected Annual Salary 12% 
Bid at Expected Annual Salary 4% 
Bid above Expected Annual Salary 33% 
Bid below Expected Annual Salary 63% 
 
A t-test of the mean confirms the under bidding to be more than just statistical 
error.  The test reveals overwhelming evidence to suggest subjects bid below the 
expected value of their annual salary over five years.  This result may indicate risk 
aversion, which will be discussed later in the chapter. 
3. Low vs. High Information Comparison 
As explained earlier, approximately half of the sample was given information 
about the expected annual salary whereas the other half was not.  If subjects used the 
information correctly, one would expect those with more information to bid closer to the 
expected annual salary.  Table 8 presents descriptive statistics of both Low and High 













Mean 89.4% 90.8% 90.1% 
Median 93.0% 96.9% 94.7% 
Standard Deviation 26.3% 23.8% 25.1% 
Minimum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Maximum 182.7% 154.9% 182.7% 
95 % Confidence Interval around the mean  87.2 - 91.7% 88.7 - 92.9% 88.5 - 91.6% 
 
The main difference in the low and high information groups appears to be the 
variation of bids within the groups.  An f-test was conducted on the two sample variances 
to establish whether they could be considered statistically equivalent, with the null 
hypothesis of the test that they were.  With a p-value of 0.025, there was strong evidence 
to suggest that the information given to subjects affects the variance of the bids.   
The sample mean of the two groups is, however, very similar.  A two sample t-
test (assuming unequal variances) was conducted to establish whether the means of the 
two groups are statistically equivalent, with the null hypothesis that they are equal.  With 
a p-value of 0.40, there was insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis.  Therefore, 
the hypothesis that the average bid of those presented with high information differed 
from those with low information is not supported.   
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Figure 14.   Distribution of bids as a percent of expected annual salary – low information 
sample 
 
Figure 15.   Distribution of bids as a percent of expected annual salary – high information 
sample 
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The graphic illustration in Figures 14 and 15 supports the test results.  While more 
information concentrates the sample around the mean, it does not appear to change the 
mean.  Whether presented more or less information, the subjects in the experiment on 
average still bid below the expected annual salary by approximately the same amount.  
One explanation is that the risk-averse nature of the subjects dictated that subjects in both 
samples generally wanted to bid at a certain amount below the expected value, and high 
levels of information simply assisted them to more accurately achieve this target. 
4. Learning Effect 
A powerful learning effect was observed in the first salary survey but was not 
observed in the second.  Figure 16 shows the bid mean and standard deviation by round.  
While both mean and standard deviation are relatively consistent over the rounds, there 
appears to be no obvious trend.  This may have been because the additional complicating 
factors introduced in the second salary survey made it more difficult to learn.  Overall, 
subjects do not appear to change their bids with experience in the second salary survey. 
 
Figure 16.   Bidding behavior across rounds in the second salary survey 
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5. Regression Analysis 
A regression analysis was conducted on the second salary survey data to isolate 
elements that affect bidding behavior in the second survey.  Regression results are 
contained in Table 9. 
 
Table 9.   Second salary survey regression 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
 Bid as a % of 
Expected Annual Salary 
Bid as a % of 
Expected Annual Salary 
Round Number 0.16940 0.17989 
 (0.16164) (0.16149) 
Subject Pool (NPS=1) -3.48726  
 (2.69832)  
Info Code (High=1) 0.74306 0.29963 
 (1.69110) (1.65647) 
Layoff Prob 20% 4.32428 3.97938 
 (1.94990)** (1.93218)** 
Layoff Prob 30% 5.88258 5.81408 
 (1.89592)*** (1.89580)*** 
Years of Service 0.02458 -0.18704 
 (0.20119) (0.11694) 
Female -4.48418 -5.07748 
 (2.37159)* (2.32749)** 
Constant 86.71907 86.80143 
 (2.16613)*** (2.16590)*** 
Observations 1037 1037 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
  
 
The regression shows that the round number and the information level did not 
have a significant effect on bidding behavior, a result not surprising given the previous 
discussion.  Being female was significant at the 5% level, meaning that holding all else 
constant, we can be 95% certain that females bid lower in the second salary survey than 
their male peers.  In the experiments, on average the females bid 5.08 percentage points 
below the males, indicating they were more risk averse.  This result is consistent with the 
findings of the first salary survey.  
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Like the first salary survey, the subject pool effect was insignificant.  NPS and 
DLI have people with different levels of experience, education, and age.  While it was 
thought that the subject pool variable could have been correlated with the years of 
service, omitting the subject pool in regression 2 of Table 9 failed to make the years of 
service variable significant.   
Interestingly, the number of years of service was not significant at the 10% level 
(although its p-value was 0.11).  In the experiment, years of service served as a proxy for 
age, and a person’s age is often a reflection of their stage of life and attitude towards risk.  
It was therefore expected that those with more years of service would bid lower.  This 
effect was not observed in the data.   
Bids with higher layoff probabilities resulted in higher bids, although they were 
still below the expected annual salary for the entire sample.  Subjects given 20% and 30% 
layoff probability bid 4.0 and 5.8 percentage points higher respectively (and closer to the 
expected annual salary) than a subject with a 10% layoff probability.  The reason for this 
may be that those presented with greater levels of risk respond by bidding somewhere 
between their best case scenario (staying with Firm A for five years) and worst case 
scenario (being laid off from Firm A after one year). This result indicates that subjects 
may insufficiently change the weighting of their best and worst case scenarios as the 
layoff probabilities change, choosing a “middle of the road” value under all layoff 
probabilities.    
6. Cost Savings Achieved with the Second Stage Auction 
Excluding the first four rounds where subjects were learning, there were 287 trials 
where subjects successfully bid and won the long-term contract.  To retain this small 
group seeking the long-term contract, Firm A saved 46.7% in salary that they would have 
otherwise paid.  In reality, however, Firm A would be interested in the savings in the total 
salary bill, not just those who selected the long-term contract.  Table 10 presents these 




the short-term contracted are laid off while the number of lesser paid long-term contract 
employees remains constant. Across the five years, Firm A would have made salary 
savings of 6.49% by adopting this strategy.   
 
Table 10.   Total salary savings by incorporating the second stage auction 
 Savings (%)
Year 1 5.56 
Year 2 5.82 
Year 3 6.36 
Year 4 7.20 
Year 5 8.17 
 
E. DISCUSSION 
In general, the bids in second salary survey are lower than in the first salary 
survey – both overall and relative to the optimal risk-neutral bid in each survey.  
Preconceived ideas that a person should be paid less for a long-term contract, as well as 
confusion with the additional complexities of the second salary survey may go part way 
to explaining lower bidding.  However risk aversion is likely be the major factor causing 
lower bidding in the second salary survey.   
Low bids in a second price auction often signal risk aversion.  In the previous 
chapter, it was highlighted that attitude towards risk should not change the fact that it is 
optimal to bid one’s true reservation value in a second price auction.  This does not mean 
that those bidding low in the second salary survey have bid irrationally; instead they may 
have rationally determined a reservation value less than the expected annual salary, and 
therefore bid that amount.  A person choosing a lower reservation value might do so for 
non-economic reasons, perhaps valuing long-term job security more important than 
income.  For example, a person may aim to win a long-term employment contract for 
income consistency to pay their mortgage.  The amount an employee bids below the 
expected annual salary reflects his/her level of risk aversion.   
Despite the reasons for bidding lower for a long-term contract, one thing is clear:  
the presence of risk aversion benefits the service as much as the individual.  This is 
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because the service could pay less to retain those on long-term contracts.  The 
experimental data suggests that by offering a five year contract to half of its retained 
employees, Firm A could make 6.49% saving in total salary over five years.    
F. CONCLUSION 
In what was one of the first known experiments using a second price auction in 
the labor market, the experiment revealed some interesting results.  The results show that 
it may require some learning or experience with the second-price auction to achieve 
accurate revelation of an individual’s reservation value.  Training before a real scenario 
therefore may be vital to the success of the auction.  Finally, the results indicate that 
people do not always bid with their heads but with their hearts; that is, despite the fact an 
individual could maximize their income by bidding differently, some value long-term 
employment or a stable stream of income more highly, and these risk averse participants 
can benefit both themselves and the service.  The next chapter discusses the effectiveness 





This chapter provides a more in-depth discussion into some of the issues that face 
the Australian Army, should they adopt a retention bonus auction such as that discussed 
in the previous chapter.   
B. QUALITY OF SOLDIERS RETAINED 
Military retention bonuses, whether set by auction or prediction techniques, 
typically attract those with fewer civilian alternatives.  Those with higher opportunity 
costs are more likely to leave the service sooner, preferring to avoid the obligation of a 
long-term contract.  Unfortunately for the service, those with greater civilian 
opportunities are often the more capable soldiers.  Without controls, any retention bonus 
system could arguably reduce the quality of the force.   
An important factor in retaining high quality soldiers is preventing poor 
performing or unqualified soldiers from being eligible to receive a retention bonus.  Such 
a policy should exist no matter how the bonus level is determined. 
A two stage auction where soldiers get an opportunity to bid for a short-  and 
long-term contract may also assist in keeping force standard high.  While better 
performing soldiers may not want a long-term contract, their high bid for a short-term 
contract may be accepted.  The service would prefer to contract high performers for 
longer, but they would accept that some additional service is better than nothing.    
C. IMPORTANCE OF A LONG-TERM CONTRACT OPTION 
The results of the experiment show that a two stage auction offering a longer term 
contract in the second stage has cost advantages over a single stage second-price auction.  
Bock (2007) outlines that cost savings are maximized when there is uncertainty about 
opportunities with the short-term contract.  Such uncertainty could be budgetary, in that 
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constraints could either reduce or eliminate future short-term bonuses.  Differing 
retention requirements in future years could add further uncertainty.  As Bock points out, 
“the element of uncertainty induces more individuals to accept the long-term contract,” 
thereby returning savings to the service.  This was certainly the case in the experiment, 
where risk averse bidding for a five year employment contract would have returned 
average savings on the order of an additional 6.5% per year to Firm A over five years. 
D. LEARNING AND TRAINING 
The powerful learning effect of the first (and most simplistic) salary survey was 
discussed in the previous chapter.  When additional complexities were introduced in the 
second salary survey, a learning effect was not observed.  Subjects having to learn and 
understand the experimental scenario to bid rationally contributed to the complexity of 
the second salary survey.  If such salary surveys were conducted in reality, auction 
participants would most probably understand the situation that they were in, meaning 
there would be one less thing to learn.  Instructions could therefore be reduced, using 
them solely to explain the auction itself.   
 To further simplify the auction mechanism, it would be important to deliver a 
training package before the auction.  Training could explain a second-price auction with 
simple examples.  Importantly, training could focus on the dominant strategy of a second-
price auction, explaining that, on average, a person could not make themselves better off 
with any strategy other than bidding their true perceived value.  Examples demonstrating 
the effect of both a high and a low bid would help convince soldiers of the best way to 
maximize their income.  Additionally, an example of a collusion attempt failing would 
help prevent soldiers from “bidding–up” a bonus.   
 With auction training, the bidding behavior of the second salary survey is likely to 
be more consistent.  This would lead to a more condensed distribution of bids, although 
“under-bidding” relative to the expected value is likely because most individuals are risk 
averse and prefer long-term job security over maximizing expected income.  
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E. IS THE NUMBER WHO WILL RECEIVE THE BONUS IMPORTANT? 
 In the experiments, subjects were told how many of their fellow employees would 
be retained from the survey.  There were two main reasons for revealing this information: 
first, it simplified the experiment, and second, it increased transparency, thereby fostering 
trust in the system.  There are, however, disadvantages to revealing retention goals, 
including making collusion easier and reducing flexibility to the service (Dr. P. 
Coughlan, personal communication, 17 Mar 2008).  An auction that does not disclose 
retention targets allows the Army to choose the cutoff bid (and therefore the number to be 
paid a bonus) after the auction, depending on the allocated budget.  This permits the 
service to offer a bonus to all eligible soldiers in times where manning is critical and the 
highest bid is within budgetary constraints.  On the other hand, when the budget is tight 
and the marginal benefit of additional soldiers is less than the marginal cost of retaining 
them, the Army could reduce the number of soldiers offered the bonus.   
F. BUDGET 
It would be naïve to think that budgets for retention bonuses are unlimited.  A 
restricted budget for retention incentives is one of the contributing factors to the manning 
shortfall in the Australian Army today.  While forecasts may predict a necessary bonus 
larger than the service can afford to pay, the restricted budget is (and must be) applied, as 
some improvement in retention is better than none at all.  Applying this logic to the 
retention bonus auction, the budget constraint must be considered when setting the 
auction cut-off bid. 
Assuming that retention goals within a particular employment category are not 
disclosed, the Army could receive bids from all employment categories before deciding 
how many from each to offer a retention bonus.  With this information, the Army can 
project costs to meet its retention priorities.  With budgetary constraints, the Army could 
allocate its funds to receive the “biggest bang for its buck,” taking into account the 
marginal benefit and cost of additional soldiers previously discussed. 
 72
Without an unlimited budget, it is impossible to guarantee all retention priorities 
will be met; however, the use of an auction will ensure the Army meets more of its 
targets than they would otherwise.   
G. TRUST 
The success of a second-price auction to set a retention bonus could not be 
achieved without trust from both parties.  On one side, the service will expect winning 
bidders to sign an employment contract based on their bid, as is customary in any 
auction-based transaction.  On the other side, soldiers must trust that the Army will honor 
their bids in a true second-price auction, equally paying all eligible winners.  Trust would 
be compromised if the Army chose to pay smaller amounts to low bidders and larger 
amounts to higher bidders.  In short, once bids were received, the Army could not change 
the auction format.    
H. BIDDING IN SMALL COHORTS - COLLUSION 
The question of whether retention bonuses set with an auction are equally 
effective in small cohorts is of great interest to the Australian Army.  Being a 
comparatively small force, the Australian Army has many cohorts of soldiers and officers 
where numbers are sufficiently small that all members know one another.  Collusion 
among a small group to “bid up” the bonus is possible.   
For example, take a scenario where the Army wants to retain nine soldiers out of a 
small employment group of ten.  Suppose that the ten soldiers are all friends, who work 
and play together.  If the Army requested bids for a bonus, offering to pay the nine 
soldiers with the lowest bids a bonus equal to the one excluded bid (that of the tenth 
soldier), then one of the friends would not receive the bonus.  While collusion may 
increase the price of the auction, the fact remains that one soldier (the highest bidder) 
does not receive the bonus, becoming the sacrificial lamb for his friends.  Had he acted 
counter to the collusive agreement by bidding more conservatively, he may have received 
the bonus at the expense of one of his peers.  An individual soldier, therefore, has no 
incentive to bid an amount higher than what he would need to remain in the service.  At 
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the same time, he has no incentive to bid lower than his reservation value because he may 
end up being retained under contract for a bonus less than he could receive as a civilian.  
Therefore, even when the retention goal is revealed in this small group, individual 
soldiers can do no better than to bid their reservation value. 
The Army could discourage inflated bids resulting from collusion by not 
disclosing retention targets.  In the unlikely scenario that an individual wants to leave the 
service for non-financial reasons and chooses to be the sacrificial lamb for his friends, the 
Army could easily lower the cutoff bid.  This would only result in one less soldier 
contracted and avoid excessive resource wastage as a result of one conspiratorial bid.    
In summary, the effect of collusion should be of little concern to the Army.  There 
are steps the Army can (and should) take to minimize collusion; however, even without 
it, the average individual has little to gain by collusion. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The practice of setting retention bonus levels based on historical data has served 
the U.S. Military well.  Retention bonuses calculated as such have been far more 
effective than other retention incentives, although all U.S. services are concerned about 
the cost of their bonus program.  Despite their relative effectiveness compared to other 
retention programs, predicting bonuses using historical data is not always precise; the 
services can either face excessive expenditures with too much retention, or fail to meet 
their retention goals.  The Australian Army will undoubtedly be less precise, without the 
benefit of 40 years of historical data. 
1. Primary Research Question Answered 
The literature shows that a second-price auction is truth revealing, in that the 
dominant strategy is to bid one’s reservation value.  A labor market experiment using a 
second-price auction to determine employee salaries supports the literature.  The 
experimental results suggest that a second-price auction has potential to determine 
retention bonus levels.  Specifically, a second price auction will allow the Army to retain 
the exact number of soldiers required at the lowest cost possible or, alternatively, retain 
the maximum number of soldiers within a given budget constraint. 
2. Secondary Research Questions Answered 
When a second auction is conducted allowing winners of the first auction to 
submit another bid for a long-term contract, the auction becomes even more cost 
effective.  Cost savings occur as a result of preferences for long-term security over 
income maximization.  While the experiments reveal an average cost saving of 6.49% per 
year over five years, the savings of the second stage depend heavily on the auction 
scenario, the number of long-term contracts available, and the resignation rate of those at 
the end of their short-term contracts. 
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For the Australian Army, the uncertainty as to whether a bonus will be available 
in future years (and the amount of any such bonus) should motivate some individuals to 
accept a longer term contract (and therefore lower bonus per annum).  This uncertainty 
returns cost savings to the service, as well as a long-term commitment from a body of 
soldiers that otherwise would not be under contract. 
If the Army is prepared to forgo the cost saving of a second salary survey, instead 
accepting the cost that would otherwise result from a single stage auction, it is possible to 
retain more capable soldiers with attractive civilian employment opportunities.  This 
could be achieved by raising the cutoff bid in the first salary survey (thereby enticing 
more “high quality” soldiers) because of the anticipated savings of the second salary 
survey.    
The Army can reduce bid inflation resulting from collusion by not disclosing 
retention goals.  By also making it clear that the number of soldiers offered a bonus will 
depend on budgetary constraints and the value of bids, colluded bid inflation becomes 
less attractive, particularly in small cohorts of soldiers.  However, even if the Army chose 
not to address the issue of collusion and to disclose retention targets, the outcome of the 
auction is unlikely to be effected when income maximization is the primary motivator.  
Bid inflation only increases the chance that an individual misses out on a bonus 
altogether when they otherwise would have accepted a lower bonus.    
A training package is almost certain to help induce truthful bidding behavior.  A 
second-price auction is not a familiar process to the average person, and without 
explaining it, soldiers may end up guessing how to maximize their bonus.  A soldier 
missing out on a bonus, when he understood his worth in civilian industry but not the 
auction mechanics, is likely to create unnecessary administrative and legal issues.  To 
avoid these un-pleasantries, it is important to ensure all participants understand the 
process through good training and by keeping the auction as simple as possible.   
 When setting retention goals for a bonus auction in the Australian Army, it is 
important to remember that additional people may be retained without a retention bonus 
due to the open-ended engagement policy.  This means that those ineligible for the 
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auction and those who bid too high could conceivably continue to serve without a bonus, 
although any service provided is likely to be short-term.  Those who bid too high have 
effectively told the Army that their employment options are better in civilian industry, 
meaning they are likely to look for alternate employment in the near future.   
3. Other Research Findings 
The intention to make retention bonuses in the Australian Army short-term 
measures, before other sustainable conditions are in place, may not be as effective as it 
sounds.  Research on U.S. Military retention incentives shows that dollar for dollar, 
bonuses are the most effective retention tool employed.  While the effect could be 
different in the Australian Army, it may be too soon to flag retention bonuses as merely 
short-term measures; further Australian research in the area may be warranted. 
Other research in the U.S. reveals that paying retention bonuses “up front” has a 
greater impact than paying throughout the contract, or worse still, at the end of the 
contract.  In particular, U.S. service members have demonstrated a preference for up-
front bonuses even when the bonus amount is lower than the present (or discounted) 
value of an alternative set of future payments.  Thus, up-front bonuses are not only more 
effective but also more affordable for the military.  This means that an AERRB retention 
bonus that pays $10,000 up front for a one year commitment is significantly more 
effective than a completion bonus that pays $30,000 at the end of a further three year 
commitment.  For a better bang for buck, the Australian Army should make future 
retention bonuses up front payments, whether set by auction or otherwise, trusting the 
contractual obligations to ensure soldiers fulfill their commitment.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY AND DEVELOPMENT 
Further experiments are necessary before introducing a second-price retention 
bonus auction into the service.  The Australian Army should look to conduct such 
experiments using a larger and representative sample of its own personnel.  Building 
upon the successful experiments conducted by Gates and Coughlan in 2007, the next 
phase of experiments should also be non-military and generic in nature.  This will allow 
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valuable data to be gathered without confounds such as individuals having differing 
civilian options, which makes it difficult to know if subjects are bidding truthfully.  
Experiments should focus on the issues listed below: 
• The improvement in bidding behavior as a result of training.  Training should be 
conducted prior to the experiment so that subjects understand the concept of a 
second-price auction, what it is trying to achieve, and the dominant strategy.  The 
training package effectiveness should be assessed by the distribution of bids and 
the number of rounds before subjects begin truthfully revealing their reservation 
value.  
• Subjects should bid against each other (instead of competing bids being generated 
by a computer simulation).  This will allow the effects of collusion to be analyzed 
in greater detail to establish if behavior matches theoretical expectations.  A 
control group should be established (where no collusion is permitted) so that 
bidding behavior can be compared to a group where subjects can collude with 
fellow subjects.    
• The effect of revealing the retention goal should also be analyzed.  Bidding 
behavior in auctions where the firm reveals retention goals should be compared to 
auctions where targets are not revealed.  These tests should be conducted with and 
without collusion.    
Focus groups should also be conducted to gain an understanding of the concerns 
regarding a retention bonus auction.  Ideally, subjects from the experiment would also be 
involved with the focus groups.  The focus groups will allow the concerns of the soldiers 
to be addressed by improving the process, instructions and training package.         
The ultimate mid-term goal would be to put the concept to the test on a small 
cohort of soldiers bidding for a real retention bonus.  It will only be through this final step 
that the concept can be refined before introducing the concept service wide. 
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APPENDIX A.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 




You are 1 of 100 employees currently working for Firm A. 
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference for Firm A or for Firm B. 
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you. 
No matter where you end up working, you will be retiring 5 years from now. 
Your only goal for the next 5 years is to maximize your total income over that time span. 
 
Downsizing at Firm A 
Firm A will be downsizing over the next 5 years. 
Firm A will begin by laying off 10% of its workforce immediately (10 out of 100 employees). 
Firm A will lay off additional employees in future years, but the exact number is uncertain at this time. 
Firm A will not be hiring any new employees (or rehiring laid off or departed employees) during this period. 
Thus, if you choose to leave or are laid off from Firm A, there will be no opportunity to return to Firm A in 
later years. 
 
Employment Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A, whether they leave now or in later years. 
If you leave Firm A now, you will work at Firm B for the next 5 years. 
If you leave Firm A after year 1, 2, 3, or 4, you will work for Firm B for the remainder of the 5 year period. 
This standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave Firm A voluntarily or are laid off. 
 
Salary Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee currently working for Firm A. 
The offer presented to each employee represents the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by 
Firm B. 
Firm B has offered different annual salary amounts to different Firm A employees. 
For each year that you work for Firm B, Firm B has offered to pay you the following annual salary: 
$90,000 
 
Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B 
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current employees at Firm A. 
You know only that all of Firm B's salary offers are spread evenly and randomly over some range. 
In other words, these salary offers are spread evenly & randomly between some lower bound & some upper 
bound. 
You do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salary offers. 
However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within this range of offers. 
Thus, it is safe to assume that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are higher than your 
offer above. 
It is also safe to assume that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are lower than your offer. 
 
Future Salary Changes 
Over the next 5 years, each employee's annual salary will only change if he/she changes employers. 
In other words, Firm A will pay you the same annual salary for each year that you work there (no salary 
raises or cuts). 
Similarly, Firm B will pay you the same annual salary for each year that you work there (no salary raises or 
cuts). 
The annual salary that you receive at the two different firms, however, may be different. 
 
Salary Survey at Firm A 
The salary paid to any Firm A employee in previous years will have no influence on his/her future salary at 
Firm A. 
Instead, the annual salary that Firm A will be pay to each of its retained employees will be determined using 
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a survey. 
Firm A is asking each of its 100 workers to specify the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to 
receive in order to remain with Firm A. 
 
Firm A will then pay the minimum salary necessary to voluntarily retain 90 of its 100 employees for next 
year. 
In particular, after collecting all 100 "salary requests" from its employees, Firm A will lay off the 10 
employees who submitted the highest salary requests. 
Each of the 10 employees laid off will immediately begin working at Firm B at the salary previously offered. 
The remaining 90 employees will work at Firm A for at least one more year. 
All employees retained by Firm A will be paid the same salary, regardless of the salary they requested. 
These retained employees will be paid the lowest salary that was requested among the 10 employees laid 
off. 
In other words, Firm A will pay all retained employees the 10th highest salary requested. 
Note that this salary will be as high or higher than the salary requested by any of the 90 retained employees. 
 
Your Salary Request to Firm A 
You must now decide what annual salary to request from Firm A. 
Remember that if your request is among the highest 10 of the 100 salary requests submitted, you will be laid 
off from Firm A and will work for Firm B for the next 5 years at the salary offer above. 
If your salary request to Firm A is not among the 10 highest, you will continue to work for Firm A for at least 
one more year and will receive an annual salary equal to the lowest salary requested among the 10 
employees not retained. 
What annual salary do you request from Firm A: 
 





APPENDIX B.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE EXPERIMENT - ABOVE 90TH PERCENTILE 
 
IF SALARY REQUEST IS ABOVE 90TH PERCENTILE OF THE DISTRIBUTION: 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:  $40,000 
The highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:  $100,000 
The 10th highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was:   $142,466 
 
Your Employer, Salary, and Income for the Next 5 Years 
Your salary request was among the 10 highest requests submitted to Firm A. 
Therefore, you will not be retained by Firm A and will instead be employed by Firm B for the next 5 years. 
Each year, you will receive the annual salary offered to you by Firm B previously. 
Thus, your income over the next 5 years will be as follows: 
 
Year 1: $90,000 
Year 2: $90,000 
Year 3: $90,000 
Year 4: $90,000 





The total above is your experimental earnings for this period. 
This total will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$450,000 of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings 
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APPENDIX C.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE EXPERIMENT - BELOW 90TH 
PERCENTILE 
IF SALARY REQUEST IS BELOW 90TH PERCENTILE OF THE DISTRIBUTION 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was: $40,000 
The highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was: $100,000 
The 10th highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was:  $142,466 
Recall that this 10th highest salary request is the lowest request submitted among the 10 employees not 
retained. 
 
Your Employer and Salary for the Next Year 
Your salary request was not among the 10 highest requests submitted to Firm A. 
Therefore, you will be retained by Firm A for the next year. 
Your salary for this first year will be equal to the 10th highest salary request submitted to Firm A as given 
above. 
 
Future Lay Offs at Firm A 
Firm A will continue to reduce the size of its workforce in future years. 
You estimate that Firm A will lay off the following percentage of its employees in each of the next 4 years: 
30% 
Employees laid off from Firm A in future years will be selected at random. 
Thus, the percentage listed above is also the probability that you will be laid off from Firm A in any given 
year. 
Conversely, the probability that you will be retained by Firm A in any future year is equal to: 
70% 
 
Your Employer in Future Years 
Remember that if you are ever laid off from Firm A, you will be immediately employed by Firm B. 
While you are certain to work for Firm A for at least the next year, you actually have 5 different possible 
patterns of employment over the next 5 years. 
In particular, you could be laid off from Firm A after 1, 2, 3, or 4 years, or you could remain with Firm A for 
the entire 5 year period. 
Each of these 5 patterns of employment and its associated probability is illustrated below: 
 
    Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 4 Pattern 5 
















       
Probability of Pattern 30% 21% 15% 10% 24% 
              
Year 1 Employer Firm: A A A A A 
Year 2 Employer Firm: B A A A A 
Year 3 Employer Firm: B B A A A 
Year 4 Employer Firm: B B B A A 





Your Salary in Future Years 
Each year that you are employed by Firm B, you will earn the annual salary previously offered to you by 
Firm B. 
Thus, each of the 5 patterns of employment illustrated above has an associated pattern of annual salaries: 
 
    Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 4 Pattern 5 
    
Firm A for 
1 Year 
Firm A for 
2 Years 
Firm A for 
3 Years 
Firm A for 
4 Years 
Firm A for 
5 Years 
       
Probability of Pattern 30% 21% 15% 10% 24% 
              
Year 1 Salary: $142, 466 $142, 466 $142, 466 $142, 466 $142, 466 
Year 2 Salary: $90,000 $142, 466 $142, 466 $142, 466 $142, 466 
Year 3 Salary: $90,000 $90,000 $142, 466 $142, 466 $142, 466 
Year 4 Salary: $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $142, 466 $142, 466 
Year 5 Salary: $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $142, 466 
              
Total 5 Year Income: $502,466  $554,932 $607,398 $659,864 $712,330 
Annual Average: $100,493  $110,986 $121,480 $131,973 $142,466 
 
Your Expected (or Weighted Average) Annual Salary 
As shown above, your average annual salary over the next 5 years could end up being any one of 5 different 
amounts. 
To determine the annual salary you can expect (on average) during this period, you must calculate a 
weighted average. 
The weighted average salary is calculated using the following two steps: 
     (1) Multiply each of the 5 possible annual average salaries by the probability of that particular pattern 
     occurring. 
     (2) Sum these values over all 5 possible employment patterns. 
 
In other words, your weighted average (or expected) annual salary is given by the following formula: 
 
Weighted Average Annual Salary = Prob1 x Avg1 + Prob2 x Avg2 + Prob3 x Avg3 + Prob4 x Avg4 + Prob5 x Avg5 
Using the values from the first and last rows of the previous chart, your expected average salary is thus: 
$119,099 
 
Possibility of a 5 Year Employment Guarantee with Firm A 
As noted previously, your employment with Firm A (and the associated salary) is currently guaranteed only 
for 1 year. 
Your employer (and thus, your salary) in later years is uncertain with each possibility analyzed 
mathematically above. 
As an alternative to this uncertainty, Firm A will give a 5 year employment guarantee to half of its retained 
employees. 
 
Another Salary Survey at Firm A 
To determine which employees will be offered 5 year employment, Firm A will conduct another salary 
survey. 
This second survey will be conducted among only those 90 employees retained after the first salary survey. 
This second salary survey will determine: 
(1) which of the 90 retained employees will be guaranteed employment with Firm A for the next 5 years; 
(2) the annual salary that will be paid to each of these 5 year employees. 
 
In this second survey, Firm A is asking each of its 90 retained employees to specify the minimum annual 
salary that he/she would need to receive in order to remain with Firm A for the next 5 years. 
Firm A will then determine the minimum 5-year annual salary necessary for 45 of its 90 retained employees 
to voluntarily remain with Firm A for 5 years. 
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In particular, after collecting all the 5-year salary requests from its 90 retained employees, Firm A will give a 
5 year guarantee of employment to the 45 employees who submitted the lowest 5-year annual salary 
requests. 
The remaining 45 employees (those who submit the highest 5-year annual salary requests) will not receive a 
5 year guarantee of employment. 
The 45 employees given a 5 year guarantee of employment will each be paid the lowest 5-year annual 
salary that was requested among the 45 employees not given a 5 year employment guarantee. 
In other words, the 45 employees given a 5 year guarantee of employment will each be paid the 45th 
highest 5-year annual salary request that was submitted in the second salary survey. 
For the 45 employees not guaranteed 5 year employment, the terms of employment with Firm A will remain 
unchanged. 
In your case this means that if you are not guaranteed 5 year employment with Firm A: 
(1) You will still be guaranteed employment with Firm A for at least 1 year. 
(2) The probability that they will be laid off from Firm A in any year after the first is still equal to:        30% 
(3) Your annual salary during any year that you are employed by Firm A will still be equal to:    $142,466 
(4) If you ever laid off from Firm A, you will be employed by Firm B for the remainder of the 5 year period. 
(5) Your annual salary during any year that you are employed by Firm B will still be equal to:      $90,000 
 
Your Second Salary Request to Firm A 
You must now decide what 5-year guaranteed annual salary to request from Firm A. 
 
Remember that if your request is among the highest 45 of the 90 salary requests submitted, you will be laid 
off from Firm A and will work for Firm B for the next 5 years at the salary offer above. 
Remember that if your 5-year annual salary request is among the lowest 45 requests in this second survey: 
(1) You are guaranteed to work for Firm A for 5 years. 
(2) You will be paid the 45th highest 5-year annual salary requested in this second survey. 
 
If your salary request to Firm A is not among the 45 lowest, you will receive the previously determined 
annual salary for as long as you work for Firm A, but you will only be guaranteed employment at Firm A for 
the first year. 
 
What 5-year guaranteed annual salary do you request from Firm A: 
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APPENDIX D.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE EXPERIMENT SECOND SALARY SURVEY 
- BELOW 50TH PERCENTILE 
IF SALARY REQUEST IS BELOW 50TH PERCENTILE OF THE NEW DISTRIBUTION: 
 
Distribution of New Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest 5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was:  $40,000 
The highest 5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was:  $100,000 
The 45th highest 5-year annual salary request submitted among all Firm A employees was:  $129,517 
 
Your Employer, Salary, and Income for the Next 5 Years 
Your salary request was among the 45 lowest requests submitted to Firm A. 
Therefore, you will be guaranteed employment with Firm A for the next 5 years. 
Each year, you will receive the 45th highest annual salary requested in the second survey which is indicated 
above. 
Thus, your income over the next 5 years will be as follows: 
 
Year 1: $129,517 
Year 2: $129,517 
Year 3: $129,517 
Year 4: $129,517 
Year 5: $129,517 
    
Total: $647,586 
 
The total above is your experimental earnings for this period. 
This total will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$450,000 of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings 
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APPENDIX E.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE EXPERIMENT SECOND SALARY SURVEY 
– ABOVE 50TH PERCENTILE 
IF SECOND SALARY REQUEST IS ABOVE 50TH PERCENTILE OF THE NEW DISTRIBUTION: 
 
Distribution of New Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest 5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was:    $40,000 
The highest 5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was:  $100,000 
The 45th highest 5-year annual salary request submitted among all Firm A employees was:   $130,867 
 
Your Terms of Employment for the Next 5 Years 
Your salary request was among the 45 highest requests submitted to Firm A. 
Therefore, you will not be given a 5 year guarantee of employment with Firm A. 
Instead, you are only guaranteed to work for Firm A for one year. 
At the end of each year with Firm A, the probability that you are laid off from Firm A is equal to:        30% 
If you are ever laid off from Firm A, you will work for Firm B for the remainder of the 5 year period. 
Each year that you work for Firm A, your annual salary will be:  $142,466 
Each year that you work for Firm B, your annual salary will be:  $90,000 
 
Your Actual Employer, Salary, and Income for the Next 5 Years 
In this section, your employer and salary for each of the next 5 years is determined based on the probability 
of being laid off from Firm A each year. 
Your actual employer in each of the next 5 years is as follows: 
 
Year 1: FIRM A 
Year 2: FIRM A 
Year 3: FIRM B 
Year 4: FIRM B 
Year 5: FIRM B 
 
Thus, your annual salary and total income over the next 5 years is as follows: 
 
Year 1: $142,666 
Year 2: $142,666 
Year 3: $90,000 
Year 4: $90,000 
Year 5: $90,000 
    
Total: $554,932 
 
The total above is your experimental earnings for this period. 
This total will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$450,000 of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings 
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